Strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium by Tonin, Simone
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
n  
 
 
 
 
Tonin, Simone (2015) Strategic foundations of oligopolies in general 
equilibrium. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7046/   
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Strategic Foundations of Oligopolies
in General Equilibrium
Simone Tonin
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Adam Smith Business School
College of Social Sciences
University of Glasgow
August 2015
Abstract
In this thesis, I study the strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equi-
librium by following the approach based on strategic market games. The thesis is
organised as follows.
In Chapter 1, I first survey some of the main contributions on imperfect com-
petition in production economies and the main problems which arise in this frame-
work. I then focus on the literature on imperfect competition in exchange economies
by considering the Cournot-Walras approach and strategic market games. I finally
discuss the main contributions on the foundations of oligopolies.
In Chapter 2, I extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange
economies with infinitely many commodities and traders by using a strategic mar-
ket game with trading posts. I prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
with trade and show that the price vector and the allocation at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium converge to the Walras equilibrium when the number of traders in-
creases. In a framework with infinitely many commodities, an oligopolist can be
an “asymptotic oligopolist” if his market power is uniformly bounded away from
zero on an infinite set of commodities, or an “asymptotic price-taker” if his market
power converges to zero along the sequence of commodities. The former corre-
sponds to the Cournotian idea of oligopolist. The latter describes an agent with
a kind of mixed behaviour since his market power can be made arbitrary small
by choosing an appropriate infinite set of commodities while it is greater than a
positive constant on a finite set.
In Chapter 3, I further study oligopolies in economies with infinitely many
commodities and traders. By using the strategic market game called “all for sale
model”, I prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker. Heuristically, an asymp-
totic price-taker exists if at least one trader makes positive bids on an infinite num-
ber of commodities and in all markets the quantities of commodities exchanged are
non-negligible.
In Chapter 4, I study if there is a non-empty intersection between the sets of
Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations in mixed exchange economies, with oligopolists
represented as atoms and small traders represented by a continuum. In a bilateral
oligopoly setting, I show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-
Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount
of one of the two commodities. I also provide four examples which show that this
characterization holds non-vacuously.
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Preface
Nowadays real world economies are characterised by large firms which often
spread their activities on many countries and it is hard to believe that they do
not have market power. In such situation, it is not clear if markets are still an
efficient way to allocate resources among agents. Crouch (2011) argues that a
political debate that continues to be organised around market and state is missing
the issues raised by the presence of big corporations. He also underlines that
“The confrontation between the market and the state that seems to
dominate political conflict in many societies conceals the existence of
this third force, which is more potent than either and transforms the
workings of both.”
In this thesis, I analyse exchange economies in which the price-taking assump-
tion is dropped and agents can influence the prices with their supply and demand
decisions. To do so, I consider the literature on strategic market games which are
models where traders can choose the amount of their initial endowments to put up
in exchange for other commodities. In this framework, I study the conditions on
the fundamentals of an economy under which market power arises endogenously
in equilibrium, i.e., foundations of oligopolies.
The main contributions of this thesis are twofold. In Chapters 2 and 3, I focus
on oligopolies in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and traders
to study agents with mixed behaviours having market power on some commodities
while being competitive on others. Perhaps surprisingly, in such framework both
agents who keep market power on an infinite set of commodities and agents whose
market power vanishes along the sequence of commodities arise endogenously in
equilibrium. This model is a starting point to analyse the differences between
global and local oligopolists. In Chapter 4, I consider mixed exchange economies
where oligopolists are represented as atoms and small traders are represented by
a continuum. In this framework, I show the necessary and sufficient conditions
under which the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations coincide. This result
helps to understand when in a market with oligopolists a competitive outcome can
arise endogenously in equilibrium.
Finally, in the rest of the thesis I use “we” instead of “I” because it is more
formal and less personal. As proposed by Thomson (2011), in single author con-
tributions “we” may mean the author and the reader.
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1Introduction
“Let me, to begin with, justify the choice, which may be surprising
since the topic has been dormant for so long. First, I think that there
is no microeconomic theory if it is not eventually cast in a general equi-
librium framework. Of course, partial models give insights, and also
serve as natural starting points. But, in its very essence, the economy
is a system of interrelated markets where the influence of what happens
at some point is unavoidably propagated throughout the system, via
the chain of markets, through the possible substitutions and comple-
mentarities between goods that are due to tastes and technologies.”
Gabszewicz (1999)
“Finally, it seems impossible to go on with analysing markets under
the assumption of perfect competition. Direct observation of economic
activity reveals that markets are the fields of “giants”, operating si-
multaneously with a fringe of small competitors. Even partial analysis
has taken this picture of the market when proposing oligopoly solutions
to describe the outcomes of imperfectly competitive markets. Behind
the demand function there is a myriad of “small” price-taking agents,
while the supply side is occupied by few agents appearing as giants,
contrasting with the dwarfs on the demand side.”
Gabszewicz (2013)
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1.1 Market power in general equilibrium theory
We have started this chapter with two quotes from Jean J. Gabszewicz as
rhetorical devices to appeal for the studying of market power in general equilibrium
models. We now briefly clarify why this area of research can provide a useful
theoretical framework to address economic issues.
It is easy to recognise that many markets in real world economies are dominated
by few giant firms which compete against each others. Even if it may be true
that sometimes perfect competition arises despite the few number of agents, as
in the Bertrand’s model, usually imperfect competition prevails. Therefore, the
first justification of studying market power is the necessity of realism in economic
models. The hypothesis of price-taking behaviours, which is crucial in the theory of
perfect competition, could hardly capture the features of markets in which agents
can manipulate prices. Furthermore, imperfect competition may take away markets
efficiency properties and then under such condition it is not clear if markets are
still an efficient way to allocate commodities among agents. This clearly makes
market power a fundamental matter to study.
The choice of using general equilibrium models is again justified by a realism
requirement. Since multinational firms are active simultaneously in several markets
and consumers’ preferences are spread over many commodities, general equilibrium
theory arises as a natural way to capture the complexity of this interrelated system.
General equilibrium models can also be used to check the robustness and consis-
tency of results obtained in partial analysis. Obviously, if we think about industrial
organisation, this cannot be done systematically for all its rich research which aims
to analyse in depth the industry level and not the whole economy. Finally, general
equilibrium theory can provide a unified framework to study and compare different
market structures. The study of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competi-
tion is usually conducted with different approaches within partial analysis and is
based on ad hoc assumptions. This is further away from the comprehensive and
coherent Walrasian system developed for perfect competitive economies.
In the next sections, we do not aim to review all the literature on general
equilibrium with imperfect competition but we focus only on those contributions
that provide an historical and theoretical framework for the next chapters of the
thesis. The literature on imperfect competition in general equilibrium was masterly
surveyed by Hart (1985), Gary-Bobo (1988), Bonanno (1990), and Gabszewicz
(1999, 2002).
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1.2 Imperfect competition: an historical overview
The first attempt to analyse analytically imperfect competition was made by
Cournot (1838). He proposes a simply theoretical framework to study a market
with oligopolistic firms and a large number of price taking consumers. He assumes
that firms produce an homogeneous commodity and that consumers are represented
by an inverse demand function. Given the demand function, each firm decides the
quantity to produce in order to maximise its profit. The equilibrium concept
introduced by Cournot, which is a particular case of the Nash equilibrium (see
Nash (1951)), captures the strategic interactions among firms. In other words,
each firm maximises its profit given the production levels of all other firms.
Many years later, Chamberlin (1933) developed a theoretical framework to
study markets with differentiated commodities. He introduces the notion of mo-
nopolistic competition which describes an industry with differentiated commodities
where each commodity is produced only by one firm whose strategic variable is the
commodity’s price. There are two types of monopolistic competition: small group
and large group. The former considers an industry with few firms and then any
change in price has an effect on the other few firms in the industry. Differently, the
latter considers an industry with many firms and then “any adjustment of price
[. . . ] by a single producer spreads its influence over so many of his competitors that
the impact felt by any one is negligible and does not lead him to any readjustment
of his own situation” (Chamberlin (1933) p.83). This is the more studied case
in the literature on monopolistic competition. By comparing the Cournot model
and the large group case, we observe that in both of them firms can manipulate
prices but while in Cournot there is strategic interaction among firms in the large
group monopolistic competition firms ignore each others. Furthermore, both con-
tributions are cast in partial equilibrium analysis which means that they do not
consider the whole economy and the system is not closed because consumers do not
formally belong to the model and they are just represented by an inverse demand
function.
Negishi (1961) and Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) made one of the first attempts to
extend to general equilibrium theory the model of imperfect competition introduced
by Chamberlin (1933) and by Cournot (1838) respectively. We now briefly describe
the main features of these two contributions (for a detailed comparison see Busetto
(2005)).
Negishi (1961) proves the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with per-
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fectly competitive consumer, some perfectly competitive firms and some monopo-
listically competitive firms. The assumptions on consumers and perfectly compet-
itive firms are standard, the novelty is the assumption that each monopolistically
competitive firm is characterized by a portfolio of commodities containing all the
commodities on which the firm has market power. It is also assumed that portfolios
are such that no firm controls all markets and none of the markets is dominated by
two firms. In this way, monopoly and oligopoly are ruled out from the analysis. In
this general equilibrium framework, monopolistic competition turns out to be an
economic configuration in which monopolistically competitive firms have market
power on some markets while behave competitively on all others and each market
is possibly dominated by only one firm. In this model, production decisions are
based on subjective (or perceived) demand curves which only show the prices con-
jectured by firms for different production levels and they may not coincide with
the real market demands. This feature is a weakness of this approach because it
introduces an element of arbitrariness in the model. Gary-Bobo (1989) showed
that all feasible allocations such that the production of each firm is greater than
zero and yields non-negative profits are equilibria in the sense defined by Negishi
(1961). In other words, it is possible to find subjective demands which sustain each
allocation as an equilibrium allocation. To overcome this indeterminacy problem,
it is necessary to consider firms which face objective demands.
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) in their attempt to extend the Cournot model to
general equilibrium theory pioneered the objective demand approach, i.e., firms face
objective demands generated by consumers utility maximisation problem. They
define an economy with production where, as in the Cournot model, firms are as-
sumed to be few whereas consumers are assumed to be many. Consumers, who
behave competitively, provide firms with labour and other primary factors which
are non-consumable and non-marketable. With these resources, firms, which have
market power and behave as players of a non-cooperative game, produce consump-
tion commodities. These commodities are then distributed to the consumers, who
have provided primary factors, as real wages according to some preassigned shares.
At the end of the production process, each consumer is thus endowed with his ini-
tial endowment plus the bundles of commodities which he receives as a shareholder
of the firms. Exchange markets are then organized, where the consumers aim at
improving their utility levels through trade. The rule of exchange consists in us-
ing a Walrasian price mechanism under which all markets clear. The equilibrium
prices resulting from these exchanges allow firms to choose the production levels
4
which maximise their profits given the production decisions of others.
Bonanno (1990) and Codognato (1994) summarised the main problems raised
by the approach of Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). Here, we just focus on two of
them, namely the existence of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium and the fact that
profit maximisation may not be a rational objective for imperfectly competitive
firms. Both these are crucial issues since they concern the consistency of the whole
theory.
In the paper of Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), the existence of a Cournot-Walras
equilibrium relies on two strong assumptions namely that the set of Walras equi-
libria resulting from the exchange of commodities among consumers contains a
unique element and that firms’ profit functions are quasi-concave. Clearly these
two assumptions are not based on the fundamentals of the economy. Furthermore,
the quasi-concavity of profit functions imposes restrictions on the shape of demand
curves. The first assumption was actually relaxed by Roberts (1980) and Dierker
and Grodal (1986). Differently, Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) showed that even
if we make standard assumptions on consumers and firms, profit functions need
not to be quasi-concave. A possible way of avoiding this ad hoc assumption is to
consider equilibria in mixed strategies. But the notion of mixed strategy is far from
being clear in this framework and additionally Dieker and Grodal (1986) showed
an example of non-existence even in mixed strategies.
Let us now discuss the problem of maximising profits in imperfect competitive
economies. The following quotation from the referee’s report of Gabszewicz and
Vial (1972) raised the issue for the first time.
“Consider a firm owned by many consumers, all of whom are identical.
Given the strategies of the other firms in the economy, this firm chooses
an output vector so as to maximize the wealth of each of its consumers.
However, it is possible that this firm could choose a different strategy
which would result in slightly lower wealth, but in a much lower price
of some particular commodity which is greatly “desired” by the owners
of the firm. Thus this alternative strategy might yield greater “real
income” to the firms owners.”
In other words, firms’ owners are interested in monetary profits only in terms
of their purchasing power and then they may not find profit maximisation as a
rational objective if it leads to higher prices for the commodities they consume.
One of the first attempts to overcome this difficulty was proposed by Mas-Colell
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(1982) who considers a model where consumers with positive share ownership in
firms consume only the numeraire commodity (which is endogenously determined).
They can be seen as a class of capitalists who leaves in an outside world. A
similar but probably more ingenious construction was proposed by Hart (1985).
He considers a model with islands in which consumers consume only in the island
where they live but get profits from other islands. In these two frameworks, profit
maximisation is a consistent objective for firms because when they maximise profits
they are also maximising the utility of their owners. These approaches can then
reconcile the trade-off between firms’ profit maximisation and shareholders’ utility
maximisation but at the price of moving the original Gabszewicz and Vial model
toward partial equilibrium analysis as it was noticed by Mas-Colell (1982) and
Hart (1985) themselves. Another way to circumvent the problem was proposed
by Dierker and Grodal (1986) by considering an economy in which each firm is
owned by only one consumer and the firm, instead of maximising profit, maximises
the indirect utility function of its owner. However, this latter approach provides
a well defined objective function for the firms only in the special case where each
firm is owned by a single consumer. Dierker and Grodal (1999) and Dierker,
Dierker, and Grodal (2001) proposed another objective for the firms based on the
maximisation of shareholders’ real wealth. A different and more drastic path was
followed by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997)
which recasts the Cournot-Walras model in exchange economies. The advantage
of analysing oligopoly in exchange economies is that it helps to study exchanges
among traders who can influence prices avoiding all other problems which arise in
production economies. We analyse in detail this approach in the next section.
1.3 Oligopolies in exchange economies
The study of oligopoly in exchange economies can be divided in two approaches:
asymmetric oligopoly and symmetric oligopoly (see also Codognato (1988)). In
the asymmetric oligopoly some consumers have market power while others act
competitively. Such framework was introduced by Codognato and Gabszewicz
(1991) and further studied by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997). In the symmetric
oligopoly all consumers are treated symmetrically and all of them act strategically.
This case was studied by using strategic market games which were introduced in the
contributions of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and Shubik (1977).
We start by describing the first approach which is very close to the spirit of
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Cournot-Walras in production economies. In order to clearly understand the in-
stitutional framework of Cournot-Walras in exchange economy, we first quote the
description provided by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) of how trade takes place in
competitive economies.
“In a competitive economy, exchange can be viewed as taking place
in the following way. Each competitive trader comes with his initial
endowment in each good to a central market-place, where the sum of
these endowments for each good is supplied for trade. A price system
is announced, which determines the income of each trader as the scalar
product of this price vector by the vector of his initial endowments.
Then each utility maximizing competitive traders buys back a bundle
of the commodities, the value of which does not exceed his income. If
the price system clears each market a competitive equilibrium obtains.”
We now describe the institutional framework of Cournot-Walras in exchange
economies. Consumers are divided in two groups: oligopolists and small traders.
Each of them is characterised by an initial endowment which represents his wealth
and by a utility function which describes his preferences. Additionally, each
oligopolist is further characterised by a portfolio of commodities which contains
the commodities on which he behaves strategically. Differently, small traders are
assumed to behave competitively on all commodities. By analogy with the above
story on perfect competition, a consumer behaves competitive on a commodity if
he supplies the market-place with all his endowment of that commodity. Differ-
ently, a consumer has a strategic behaviour, if he supplies the market-place only
with a restricted share of his endowment. Therefore, small traders send to the
market-place all their endowments while oligopolists can restrict the supply of the
commodities in the portfolios. The process of exchange can be seen as organised in
two stages. First, each oligopolist chooses the amount of commodities he wants to
sell keeping for later consumption the remaining share. In the second stage, each
consumer demands the preferred commodity bundles, according to the Walrasian
demands, and prices are computed in a way that all markets clear. In order to
clarify the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium, we now show an example in a
two-commodity exchange economy.
Example 1. Consider an exchange economy with the following set of consumers
{1, 2, 3, 4}. The initial endowments and utility functions of traders are as follows.
wi = (2, 0), ui(xi) = ln(1 + xi1) + x
i
2, for i = 1, 2, and w
i = (0, 5), ui(xi) =
7
2xi1 − 12(xi1)2 + xi2, for i = 3, 4. We assume that consumers 1 and 2 are oligopolists
while consumers 3 and 4 are small traders. Since we consider an exchange economy
with only two commodities and corner endowments, to find the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium we only need to calculate the Walrasian demands for the small traders
and then find the best supply decisions of oligopolists. We solve the following
maximisation problem to find the Walrasian demands of consumers 3 and 4.
max
xi1,x
i
2
2xi1 −
1
2
(xi1)
2 + xi2,
subject to p1x
i
1 + p2x
i
2 ≤ p25,
xi1, x
i
2 ≥ 0,
for i = 3, 4. It is straightforward to verify that the following Walrasian demands
are the solutions of the maximisation problem above.
xi1 = 2−
p1
p2
,
xi2 =
5p22 + p
2
1 − 2p1p2
p22
,
for i = 3, 4. Let q1 and q2 be the amounts of commodity 1 that consumers 1 and 2
send to the market-place respectively. We normalise to 1 the price of commodity 2
and p1 is such that the market for commodity 1 clears, i.e., x
3
1 +x
4
1 = q
1 +q2. Then,
the price of commodity 1 is given by p1 = 2− 12(q1 +q2) and the commodity bundles
of oligopolists are determined as follows. xi1 = w
i
1− qi and xi2 = (2− 12(q1 + q2))qi,
for i = 1, 2. We solve the following maximisation problem to find the optimal
supply decision qi.
max
qi
log(1 + 2− qi) +
(
2− 1
2
(q1 + q2)
)
qi,
subject to 0 ≤ qi ≤ 2,
for i = 1, 2. It is straightforward to verify that q1 = q2 = 1 is the solution of the
maximisation problem. Hence, the price vector and the allocation at the Cournot-
Walras equilibrium of this exchange economy are
(p1, p2) = (1, 1),
(xi1, x
i
2) = (1, 1), for i = 1, 2,
(xi1, x
i
2) = (1, 4), for i = 3, 4.
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The model proposed by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) makes it possible to
deal with Cournotian oligopoly in a general equilibrium framework while avoiding
some of the problems raised by the Gabszewicz and Vial approach. However, the
problem of existence of a Cournot-Walras equilibrium remains open. Bonnisseau
and Florig (2003) provided an existence result which holds only for linear exchange
economies. Another issue which arises in this framework was stressed by Okuno,
Postelwaite, and Roberts (1980).
“Traditional general equilibrium treatments of such situations [in
which some but not all agents may have market power] have been de-
ficient in that they have simply assumed a priori that certain agents
behave as price takers while others act non-competitively, with no for-
mal explanation being given as to why a particular agent should behave
one way or the other.”
Indeed, Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) do not provide a formal explanation on
why some consumers are considered oligopolists while others are considered small
traders. Obviously, a heuristic explanation is that consumers are oligopolists if
they hold a commodity whose ownership is concentrated among few of them while
small traders own commodities whose ownership is spread over many consumers.
In any case, the example above shows that it is also possible to consider odd cases
in which some consumers are assumed to be small traders even if there are only
two of them.
Differently, symmetric oligopolies overcome the issue raised by Okuno et al.
(1980) because in these models all traders behave strategically. This approach
is usually based on strategic market games, which are games where all traders
decide simultaneously how much of the commodities in their endowments put up
in exchange for other commodities. There are many types of strategic market
games (see Giraud (2003)) and here we focus on the trading post model and the
window model which can be seen as different institutional mechanisms through
which prices are determined.
In the former, trade is decentralised through a system of trading posts where
commodities are exchanged. There are two variants of this model which were
studied by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and Amir, Shubik, Sahi, and Yao (1990)
respectively. In the first variant, there is one commodity which has the role of
commodity money and it is used to buy all other commodities. So, each trader
simultaneously puts up quantities of the commodities he holds in exchange for
9
commodity money and quantities of commodity money in exchange for other com-
modities. In each trading post a commodity is exchanged for commodity money
and the price is determined as the ratio of the two amounts exchanged. Differently,
Amir et al. (1990) study a model in which there is a trading post for each pair of
commodities, i.e., any commodity can be used to buy other commodities. Prices
are then computed in each trading post as in the previous model but since there
is a price for each pair of commodities, they are not necessarily consistent through
pairs of markets in which the same commodity is exchanged.
In the latter, the window model, any commodity can be used to buy other
commodities, as in Amir et al. (1990), but trade is centralised by a clearing house
in which there is a “window” for each commodity. All bids to buy a commodity
are aggregated in the window for that commodity and the clearing house carries
out a massive coordinated computation in order to find consistent prices which
clear all markets. This model was initially proposed informally by Lloyd Shapley
and subsequently analysed in detail by Sahi and Yao (1989). In all these three
contributions, Dubey and Shubik (1978), Amir et al. (1990), and Sahi and Yao
(1989), the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium was proved. We now consider
an example of the strategic market game considered by Dubey and Shubik (1978)
in which the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used as equilibrium concept.
Example 2. Consider the exchange economy defined in Example 1 but in this
case, since we deal with a strategic market game, all traders act strategically. Let
commodity 2 be commodity money and we then normalize its price to 1. Since we
consider an exchange economy with only two commodities and corner endowments,
the only actions available to traders 1 and 2 are q1 and q2 respectively, which are the
amounts of commodity 1 offered in exchange for commodity money. Analogously,
the only actions available to traders 3 and 4 are b3 and b4 respectively, which are the
amounts of commodity money offered for commodity 1. The price of commodity
1 is determined according the following rule
p1 =
{
b3+b4
q1+q2
if q1 + q2 6= 0,
0 if q1 + q2 = 0.
Traders’ commodity bundles are determined as follows.
xi1 = w
i
1 − qi,
xi2 = p1q
i,
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for i = 1, 2, and
xi1 =
bi
p1
,
xi2 = w
i
2 − bi,
for i = 3, 4. We solve the following maximisation problems to find the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium.
max
qi
ln(1 + 2− qi) + p1qi,
subject to 0 ≤ qi ≤ 2,
for i = 1, 2, and
max
bi
2
bi
p1
− 1
2
(
bi
p1
)2
+ (5− bi),
subject to 0 ≤ bi ≤ 5,
for i = 3, 4. By combining the solutions of both maximisation problems, we obtain
the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
(q1, q2, b3, b4) =
(
5−√17
2
,
5−√17
2
,
3
√
17− 11
4
,
3
√
17− 11
4
)
.
Hence, the price vector and the allocation at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this
exchange economy are
(p1, p2) =
(√
17− 1
4
, 1
)
,
(xi1, x
i
2) =
(√
17 + 3
4
,
3
√
17− 11
4
)
, for i = 1, 2,
(xi1, x
i
2) =
(
5−√17
4
,
31− 3√17
4
)
, for i = 3, 4.
The Cournot-Walras approach in exchange economies and strategic market
games have the common characteristic that consumers/traders supply the mar-
ket with shares of their initial endowment in order to purchase other commodities
and therefore both of them can be considered as Cournotian models. However, they
differ in the institutional organisation of the exchange process which is purely Wal-
rasian in Cournot-Walras whereas it is non-Walrasian in strategic market games.
In the two examples above, the two exchange economies considered are the same
but the allocations at the Cournot-Walras equilibrium and at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium are different because in Example 1 consumers 3 and 4 behave compet-
itively while in Example 2 they behave strategically.
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Since in strategic market games all traders are treated symmetrically, it is not
necessary to make ad hoc assumptions on traders’ behaviours. But this means that
the problem of developing a model of asymmetric oligopoly in which the differences
in traders’ behaviours are not assumed a priori but are endogenously determined re-
mains open. This is the so called problem of “foundations of asymmetric oligopoly”
(hereafter simply “foundations of oligopoly”). We analyse this issue in the next
section by continuing to focus on exchange economies.
1.4 Foundations of oligopolies
It is worth to stress that an issue similar to the foundations of oligopoly arises
also in perfect competitive economies and it is called “foundations of perfect com-
petition”. The Walrasian analysis in the synthesis reached in the contributions of
Arrow and Debreu (1954), Debreu (1959), and Arrow and Hahn (1971) crucially
relies on the price-taking assumption. It is then important to study under which
conditions on the fundamentals of an economy agents consider prices as given en-
dogenously in equilibrium. We first recall briefly the main results obtained on
the foundations of perfect competition and we then consider the foundations of
oligopoly.
There are two approaches to provide a foundation to perfect competition: the
cooperative approach and the non-cooperative one. The first is based on the notion
of core which was first proposed by Edgeworth (1881) who was interested in showing
how the presence of many agents would lead them to consider prices as given.
Debreu and Scarf (1963) developed a general model of the Edgeworth idea. They
provide a limit result showing that when an economy is replicated, the allocations
in the core shrink to the Walras allocations. This result is heuristically based
on the fact that when the number of trader increases traders’ influence on prices
decreases and at the limit totally disappears. Aumann (1964) established a result
at the limit by considering an economy with a continuum of traders and by showing
that the allocations in the core coincide with the Walras allocations. In this model,
each trader is negligible and then he cannot influence the prices.
When the non-cooperative approach is used to give a foundation to the price-
taking assumption, we provide a strategic foundation of perfect competition. Strate-
gic market games were originally developed to study the strategic foundations of
perfect competition because traders influence prices with their choices. Indeed,
the papers of Dubey and Shubik (1978), Sahi and Yao (1989), and Amir et al.
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(1990) showed that when the economy is replicated a` la Debreu and Scarf, the
price vector and the allocation, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to the
Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy. By using strategic market
games, it is also possible to establish results at the limit a` la Aumann. Dubey and
Shapley (1994) and Codognato and Ghosal (2000) extended to exchange economies
with a continuum of traders the models of Dubey and Shubik (1978) and Sahi and
Yao (1989) respectively. Mas-Colell (1980) surveyed the main contributions on the
strategic foundations of perfect competition by considering also the approaches
which do not rely on strategic market games (see Robert and Postlewaite (1974),
Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1983), and Novshek and Sonnenschein (1983) among
others).
The problem of providing a foundation to oligopoly can be essentially reduced
in finding a mathematical framework in which endogenously in equilibrium some
traders have market power and others behave competitively. In the cooperative
approach, Dre`ze, Gabszewicz, and Gepts (1969) adopted a partial replication which
leaves some traders as in the original economy while increasing the number of
others. With this variation of the Debreu and Scarf replica, the set of traders
becomes a mixture of “giants” and “dwarfs” where the former ones keep market
power while the latter ones lose it. Differently, Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and
Shitovitz (1973), by following the Aumann approach, considered the core of mixed
exchange economies where oligopolists are represented as atoms, and small traders
are represented by a continuum. An atom is a trader whose initial endowment
is large compared to the total endowment of the economy while a trader in the
continuum holds only a negligible part of it. This approach, based on mixed
exchange economies, overcomes the problem raised by Okuno et al. (1980) as
remarked in Shitovitz (1973).
“The main point in our treatment is that the small and the large
traders are not segregated into different groups a priori; they are treated
on exactly the same basis. The distinctions we have found between
them are an outcome of the analysis; they have not been artificially
introduced in the beginning, as is the case in the classical approach.”
In exchange situations with non-negligible and negligible traders, the core does not
generally coincide with the Walras allocations because atoms can manipulate the
coalition formation and the allocation of commodities at the core of an economy
(see for instance Example 1 in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, Gabszewicz and Mertens
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(1971) and Shitovitz (1973) established some equivalence theorems for mixed ex-
change economies, similar to the one proved by Aumann (1964) in continuum
economies. In particular, Shitovitz’s Theorem B shows that the presence of an ar-
bitrary small (but not infinitesimal) oligopolist cancels out the market power of all
oligopolists. Okuno et al. (1980) found this result so counterintuitive to call into
question the use of the cooperative approach to study oligopoly in general equilib-
rium. In their contribution, they keep the framework of mixed exchange economy,
which seems useful to study oligopoly because introduce an element of asymmetry
among traders, and replace the core solution concept with a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of the strategic market game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978). In this
non-cooperative framework, they show that, under the assumptions of Shitovitz’s
Theorem B, the Cournot-Nash allocations do not coincide with the Walras allo-
cations. This result allows them to conclude that the non-cooperative approach
is a useful one to study oligopoly in a general equilibrium framework as the small
traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while the oligopolists keep their
strategic power. Furthermore, price taking and price making behaviours are en-
dogenously determined in equilibrium and they are not assumed a priori. However,
Okuno et al. (1980) considered particular types of mixed exchange economies with
only two commodities and interior initial endowments and they do not provide
an existence result. Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) generalized Okuno et
alii’s model to mixed exchange economies with a finite number of commodities by
using the strategic market game analysed by Sahi and Yao (1989) and they proved
for such model the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Therefore, this con-
tribution provides a strategic foundation of oligopoly since it proves the existence
of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which endogenously traders on the continuum
behave competitively while atoms keep market power.
This asymmetric oligopoly obtained by considering strategic market games in
mixed exchange economies is similar to the asymmetric oligopoly considered in
the Cournot-Walras approach in exchange economies. However, Codognato (1995)
showed that in mixed exchange economies the set of Cournot-Nash allocations
does not coincide with the set of Cournot-Walras allocations. This is due to the
fact that the Cournot-Walras approach has an intrinsic two-stage structure –the
supply decisions of oligopolists and the exchange of commodities among traders–
whereas in strategic market games all traders choose their actions simultaneously.
Consequently, the strategic foundation provided in Busetto et al. (2011) concerns a
simultaneously oligopoly which is different from the case considered in the Cournot-
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Walras approach. There is also a second reason for the non-equivalence between the
two models which is more subtle. In the Cournot-Walras approach, each oligopolist
is characterised by a mixed behaviour, since he behaves strategically in making his
supply decisions on the commodities in his portfolio while acts competitively in
demanding all commodities.1 Differently, in strategic market games atoms behave
strategically on all commodities.
The issue of providing a strategic foundations to the Cournot-Walras approach
was studied by Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2008). They first provide a new
definition of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which oligopolists behave strategically
on all commodities in the economy. They then reformulate the window model
as a two-stage game in which atoms move in the first stage and traders in the
continuum move in the second stage. With this new definition of Cournot-Walras
equilibrium and the two-stage game, they show that the set of Cournot-Walras
equilibria coincide with a specific set of subgame perfect equilibria, which is called
the set of Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibria. Unfortunately, the paper does not
provide an existence result for a Pseudo-Markov perfect equilibrium, which is the
Cournot-Walras equilibrium.
1.5 Outline of the thesis
This thesis studies oligopolies in two different kinds of exchange economies. In
Chapters 2 and 3, we consider exchange economies with infinitely many commodi-
ties and traders while, in Chapter 4, we consider mixed exchange economies with
two commodities. However, in all three chapters, the analysis is developed by us-
ing a strategic market game with trading posts where trade takes place by using
commodity money.
In the previous sections, we have seen that both the contributions of Negishi
(1961) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) consider agents with mixed behaviours:
the monopolistically competitive firms and the oligopolists respectively. A critique
similar to the one stressed by Okuno et al. (1980) can be raised for these two
models: no formal explanation is given as to why a particular trader should behave
strategically on some commodities and competitively on others. In Chapter 2 and
3, we address this issue by considering a strategic market game with a countable
infinity of commodities and traders in order to see if in such framework traders
1In Example 1 it is not possible to see this feature because we consider a two-commodity
exchange economy with corner endowments.
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with mixed behaviours arise endogenously in equilibrium. Indeed, when a trader
is active on an infinite set of commodities, his market power can vanish along
the sequence of commodities or can remain non-negligible. To describe these new
phenomena, we introduce the notion of “asymptotic oligopolist”, which describes
a trader whose market power is uniformly bounded away from zero on an infinite
set of commodities, and the notion of “asymptotic price-taker”, which describes a
trader whose market power converges to zero along the sequence of commodities.
It is the latter that represents a trader with a kind of mixed behaviour since his
market power can be made arbitrary small by choosing an appropriate infinite set
of commodities while it is greater than a positive constant on a finite set.
In Chapter 2, we extend the strategic market game developed by Dubey and
Shubik (1978) to exchange economies with a double infinity of commodities and
traders. The main results of the chapter are a theorem of existence of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium in which all commodities are exchanged and a theorem of con-
vergence which shows that when the economy is replicated the price vector and
the allocation, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to the Walras equilib-
rium of the underlying exchange economy. Furthermore, we illustrate the notions
of asymptotic oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker by means of examples. We
also show the main difficulties which arise in proving the existence of asymptotic
price-takers.
In Chapter 3, we address this last issue by considering a variation of the Dubey
and Shubik game called “all for sale model”. In this model, at the start of the
game all traders are required to deposit all the commodities in their initial endow-
ment, except commodity money, in the appropriate trading post in exchange for
non-negotiable receipts. The fact that all commodities go into the trading posts
at the beginning of the game simplifies the mathematical analysis of the model.
In such framework, we provide the sufficient conditions on the fundamentals of an
economy under which an asymptotic price-taker exists. Heuristically, an asymp-
totic price-taker exists if all markets are thick, i.e., the quantities of commodities
exchanged in each trading post are non-negligible. Furthermore, we prove the ex-
istence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the all for sale model with an infinite
number of commodities and traders. It is worth to note that even if the games
considered in the two chapters are similar the two proofs of existence require dif-
ferent assumptions and one is based on the Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg Fixed Point
Theorem while the other is based on the Brouwer–Schauder–Tychonoff Fixed Point
Theorem (see Corollaries 17.55 and 17.56 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
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In Chapter 4, which is the part devoted to mixed exchange economies, we study
the strategic foundations of oligopoly in a bilateral oligopoly framework. In the
previous section, we have seen that Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz
(1973) were able to establish some equivalence results between the allocations in
the core and the Walras allocations in mixed exchange economies. In this chapter,
we raise the question whether, in the non-cooperative approach, an equivalence, or
at least a non-empty intersection, between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras
allocations may hold in mixed exchange economies. We answer to this question
by showing that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot–Nash alloca-
tion to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of
the two commodities. When our condition fails to hold, we also confirm, through
some examples, the result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980): small traders al-
ways have a negligible influence on prices, while oligopolists keep their strategic
power even when their behaviour turns out to be Walrasian in the cooperative ap-
proach. Furthermore, we discuss the threefold equivalence among the sets of core,
Cournot-Nash, and Walras allocations with some examples. Unfortunately, our
result depends on atoms’ demand behaviours at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and
then further research should be devoted to find the conditions on the fundamentals
of an economy, i.e., traders’ size, endowments, and preferences, under which our
theorem holds.
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2Non-Cooperative Oligopoly in Economies with
Infinitely Many Commodities and Traders
2.1 Introduction
The celebrated works of Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) introduced
the theory of monopolistic competition to overcome the cleavage between the com-
plementary approaches of perfect competition and monopoly. Indeed both believed
that the assumption of perfect competition was too restrictive and that the real
world was characterised by a mixture of competitive behaviour and market power.
The aim of this chapter is to develop a coherent and tractable theoretical model
in which agents with some kind of mixed behaviour – market power on some mar-
kets and competitive behaviour on others – can arise endogenously in equilibrium
without making ad hoc assumptions.
To consider traders who are “small” compared to the whole economy and may
display the mixed behaviour, we extend the analysis of non-cooperative oligopoly
to exchange economies with a countable infinity of commodities and traders. The
infinity of commodities can be seen as a set of differentiated commodities by using
the Hotelling line. Our analysis is based on the literature on strategic market games
initiated by the seminal papers of Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and
Shubik (1977) to study exchange economies in which all traders can influence the
0Some of the materials of this chapter were published in Ghosal S., Tonin S. (2014), “Non-
Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities”, Discussion
Paper 2014-15, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow.
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prices. In this games, when traders and commodities are finite, all traders turn
out to have market power on all commodities. Dubey and Shapley (1994) and
Codognato and Ghosal (2000) considered strategic market games with a continuum
of traders to study agents that are negligible when compared to the whole economy
and then behave competitively in equilibrium. Differently, in our framework with
“small” agents, the market power of a trader active on an infinite set of commodities
can vanish along the sequence of commodities or can remain non-negligible as in
the finite case. To describe these phenomena, we introduce two new notions. We
say that a trader is an “asymptotic oligopolist” if his market power is uniformly
bounded away from zero on an infinite subset of commodities, otherwise, if his
market power converges to zero along the sequence of commodities, we say that
the trader is an “asymptotic price-taker”. The former can be simply interpreted
as the extension of the classical notion of oligopolist to infinite economies (see
Cournot (1838) and Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) for the study of oligopolists in
partial equilibrium and in general equilibrium respectively). The latter describes
a trader with a kind of mixed behaviour since his market power can be made
arbitrary small on an infinite set of commodities while it is greater than a positive
constant only on a finite number of commodities.
In the previous literature on imperfect competition the mixed behaviour was
usually obtained by considering agents characterised by portfolios of commodities
which contain the commodities on which agents have market power. For instance,
Negishi (1961) extended the theory of monopolistic competition of Chamberlin
(1933) and Robinson (1933) from partial to general equilibrium. To do so, he
considers monopolistically competitive firms characterized by portfolios of com-
modities containing all the commodities on which a firm has market power. He
further assumes that portfolios are strict subsets of all commodities so that a mo-
nopolistically competitive firm has market power on a subset of commodities while
it acts competitively on all others. In a similar vein, d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Fer-
reira, and Ge´rard-Varet (1997) considered exchange economies in which consumers
are characterised by portfolios of commodities to introduce the “Cournotian Mo-
nopolistic Competition Equilibrium” which aims to generalize both the Cournot’s
solution and the monopolistic competition in partial equilibrium. Finally, Gab-
szewicz and Michel (1997) introduced the notion of portfolio in the Cournot-Walras
approach in exchange economies initiated by Codognato and Gabszewicz (1991).
In their model, some traders are defined oligopolists and each of them is charac-
terized by a portfolio which is a subset of the commodities held by the oligopolist.
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Therefore, each oligopolist has a mixed behaviour: strategic behaviour in supply-
ing the commodities which belong to the portfolio and competitive behaviour in
demanding all the commodities and in supplying the commodities which are not in
the portfolio. A common feature of all these contributions is that the portfolio of
commodities is a primitive of the model and then no formal explanation is given as
to why a particular trader should behave strategically on some commodities and
competitively on others. In contrast, by using strategic market games, traders’
market power is not assumed but is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Our contributions are as follows. We first define an exchange economy with
a countable infinity of commodities and traders having a structure of multilateral
oligopoly, that is an economy in which each trader holds only commodity money
and one other commodity. We then extend the strategic market game analysed
by Dubey and Shubik (1978) to this particular setting. This is a strategic market
game with commodity money in which there is a trading post for each commodity
where the commodity is exchanged for commodity money. The actions available
to traders are offers, amounts of commodities put up in exchange for commodity
money, and bids, amounts of commodity money given in exchange for other com-
modities. Since in this game a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with no trade always
exists, we prove the existence of an “active” Cournot-Nash equilibrium at which
all commodities are exchanged. After having defined the model and proved the ex-
istence result, we analyse traders’ market power at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium by
introducing the formal definitions of asymptotic oligopolist and asymptotic price-
taker. We then consider some examples to illustrate these two notions and to show,
heuristically, under which conditions an asymptotic oligopolist exists. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, we construct an example where, even if the number of traders active in
each trading post is not uniformly bounded from above, there are traders “big
enough”, in terms of initial endowment of commodity money, who are asymptotic
oligopolists. In Example 4, we show why an asymptotic oligopolist and an asymp-
totic price-taker can be heuristically interpreted as global and local oligopolists
respectively. Furthermore, this example clarifies why the definitions of asymptotic
oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker are based on the notion of limit. As in the
previous contributions on strategic market games (see Dubey and Shubik (1978),
Sahi and Yao (1989), and Amir, Sahi, Shubik, and Yao (1990), among others), we
prove that the price vector and the allocation, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
converge to the Walras equilibrium when the number of each type of trader tends
to infinity. We finally consider the case of exchange economies with an infinite
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aggregate endowment of commodity money. In such setting, we prove the exis-
tence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium and we consider some examples with
asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takers. Obviously, since there is an
infinite amount of commodity money, a Walras equilibrium does not exist.
From a mathematical point of view, our approach relies on the literature on
economies with infinitely many commodities and with a double infinity of commodi-
ties and traders initiated by Bewley (1972) and Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980)
respectively. Our existence result is different from the one provided by Dubey and
Shubik (1978) because we prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at
which all commodities are exchanged while they proved the existence of an “equi-
librium point” that is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which some commodities are
legitimately not exchanged (see Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998) and Busetto and
Codognato (2006) for a detailed analysis on “legitimately inactive” trading posts).
Furthermore, the proof of existence adapts the approach used by Bloch and Ferrer
(2001) for the case of two commodities to a setting with an infinite set of commodi-
ties and it is based on the Brouwer–Schauder–Tychonoff Fixed Point Theorem and
on the Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. This last theorem is systematically
used to prove that each commodity is exchanged at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Since we deal with a framework with an infinite number of commodities, some non
classical restrictions on marginal utilities are needed to ensure that the vector of
prices lies in a compact set bounded away form zero.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the mathe-
matical model. In Section 2.3, we prove the existence theorem. In Section 2.4,
we introduce the definitions of asymptotic oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker
and we show the examples. In Section 2.5, we prove the convergence theorem. In
Section 2.6, we consider exchange economies with an infinite aggregate endowment
of commodity money. In Section 2.7, we draw some conclusions from our analysis.
In the appendixes, we list some mathematical definitions and results, we relate
our market power measure with the notions of marginal price and average price
introduced by Okuno, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1980), and we compare our model
with the strategic market game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978).
2.2 Mathematical model
In this section, we define an exchange economy with a countable infinity of
commodities and traders and the strategic market game associated to it. Further-
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more, we make the assumptions necessary to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium at which all commodities are exchanged.
Let Tt be a finite set with cardinality k strictly greater than 1. Elements of Tt
are traders of type t. The set of traders is I = ∪∞t=1Tt. The set of commodities is
J = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. The consumption set is denoted by X. A commodity bundle x is
a point in X with xj the amount of commodity j. A trader i is characterised by an
initial endowment, wi ∈ X, and a utility function, ui : X → R, which describes his
preferences. Traders of the same type have the same initial endowment and utility
function. The context should clarify whether the superscript refers to a trader type
or to a trader. An exchange economy is then a set kE = {(ui, wi) : i ∈ I}, with k
the number of traders of each type.
An allocation x is a specification of a commodity bundle xi, for each i ∈ I,
such that
∑
i∈I x
i
j =
∑
i∈I w
i
j, for each j ∈ J . A price vector is denoted by p.
Given a price vector p, we define the budget set of a trader i to be Bi(p) = {x ∈
X :
∑∞
j=0 pjx
i
j ≤
∑∞
j=0 pjw
i
j}. A Walras equilibrium is a pair (p,x) consisting of a
price vector p and an allocation x such that xi is maximal with respect to ui in i’s
budget set, for each i ∈ I.
A commodity j is desired by a trader i if ui is an increasing function of the
variable xij and limxij→0
∂ui
∂xij
= ∞, for any fixed choice of the other variables. The
set of commodities desired by a trader i is denoted by Li.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Let σ be a positive constant. The initial endowment of a type
t trader is such that wt0 > 0, w
t
t > σ, and w
t
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for
t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 2. Let e be a positive constant such that σ < e. The aggregate initial
endowment of each commodity is such that
∑∞
t=1 w
t
0 < e and
∑∞
t=1 w
t
j = w
j
j < e,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Assumption 3. The consumption set X is a subset of the space of non-negative
bounded sequences `+∞ endowed with the product topology, i.e., X = {x ∈ `+∞ :
supj |xj| ≤ ke}.1
Assumption 4. The utility function of a type t trader is continuous, continuously
1All the mathematical definitions and results can be found in Appendix 2.A.
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Fre`chet differentiable,2 non-decreasing, and concave, for t = 1, 2, . . . . Moreover,
let λ and f be two positive constants such that λ < f , the marginal utilities of
a type t trader are such that (i) λ ≤ ∂ut
∂xt0
(xt) ≤ f and λ ≤ ∂ut
∂xtt
(xt) ≤ f , for each
xt ∈ X; (ii) ∂ut
∂xtt
(xt) ≤ ∂ut
∂xt0
(xt), for each xt such that xtt = w
t
t, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 5. A commodity j is desired by at least one type of trader, for each
j ∈ J \ {0}.
The first assumption formalises the notion of multilateral oligopoly and the sec-
ond ensures that the aggregate initial endowment of all commodities is uniformly
bounded from above. The third assumption imposes restrictions on the consump-
tion set which are standard in the literature on infinite economies. In the first part
of Assumption 4, we made the classical restrictions on traders’ preferences. We
need the additional conditions (i) and (ii) on the marginal utilities of commodity
money and the commodity held by the trader because the space of commodities is
infinite. Condition (i) is needed to prove that the price vector lies in a compact set
uniformly bounded away from zero. Condition (ii) guarantees that each trader puts
up in exchange the commodity in his initial endowment at the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. Utility functions which satisfy these conditions are, for instance, linear in
commodity money and separable respect to the commodity in the endowment of
the trader, i.e., ut(x) = xt0 + z
t(xtt) + v
t(xt1, . . . , x
t
t−1, x
t
t+1, . . . ).
3 The last assump-
tion is standard in the literature on strategic market games but our definition of
desired commodity is stronger than the one of Dubey and Shubik (1978) because
we impose restrictions on the limits of marginal utilities.
We now introduce the strategic market game kΓ associated with the exchange
economy, with k the number of traders of each type.4 In this game, each trader
has two types of actions: the offer of the commodity in his initial endowment and
the bids of commodity money on all other commodities. So, the strategy set of a
trader i of type t is
Si =
{
si = (qit, b
i
1, . . . , b
i
t−1, b
i
t+1, . . . ) : 0 ≤ qit ≤ wit, bij ≥ 0, for j ∈ J \ {0, t},
and
∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0
}
,
2Differentiability should implicitly be understood to include the case of infinite partial deriva-
tives along the boundary of the consumption set (for a discussion of this case, see, for instance,
Kreps (2012), p. 58).
3Shubik and Yao (1989) made assumptions similar to ours to prove the existence of an equi-
librium in an infinite-horizon strategic market game with commodity money.
4A similar game was introduced by Shubik (1973). In Appendix 2.C, we prove that in our
setting the game kΓ is equivalent to the game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) in terms of
attainable commodity bundles at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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where qit is the offer of commodity t that trader i puts up in exchange for commodity
money and bij is the bid of commodity money that he makes on commodity j.
Without loss of generality, we make the following technical assumption on the
strategy set.
Assumption 6. The set Si is a subset of `+∞ endowed with the product topology,
for each i ∈ I, i.e., Si ⊆ {si ∈ `+∞ : supj |sij| ≤ e}.
This assumption implies that Si lies in a normed space and therefore in a Hausdorff
space. Let S =
∏
i∈I S
i and S−z =
∏
i∈I\{z} S
i. Let s and s−i be elements of S and
S−i respectively.
In the game, there is a trading post for each commodity where its price is
determined and the commodity is exchanged for commodity money. For each
s ∈ S, the price vector p(s) is such that
pj(s) =
{
b¯j
q¯j
if q¯j 6= 0,
0 if q¯j = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with q¯j =
∑
i∈Tj q
i
j and b¯j =
∑
i∈I\Tj b
i
j. By Assumption 2,
the sums q¯j and b¯j are uniformly bounded from above, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. For
each s ∈ S, the final holding xi(s) of a trader i of type t is such that
xi0(s) = w
i
0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
bij + q
i
tpt(s), (2.1)
xit(s) = w
i
t − qit,
xij(s) =
{
bij
pj(s)
if pj(s) 6= 0,
0 if pj(s) = 0,
(2.2)
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
The payoff function of a trader i, pii : S → R, is such that pii(s) = ui(xi(s)).
We now introduce the definitions of an active trading post, a best response
correspondence, and a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. A trading post for a commodity j is said to be active if q¯j > 0 and
b¯j > 0, otherwise we say that the trading post is inactive.
Definition 2. The best response correspondence of a trader i is a correspondence
φi : S−i → Si such that
φi(s−i) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
pii(si, s−i),
for each s−i ∈ S−i.
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Definition 3. An sˆ ∈ S is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ if sˆi ∈ φi(sˆ−i), for
each i ∈ I.
We also define the following particular types of Cournot-Nash equilibria. An
active Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium such that all trad-
ing posts are active. A type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium such that all traders of the same type play the same strategy.
An interior Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium such that∑
j 6=0,t b
i
j < w
i
0, for each i ∈ I.
2.3 Theorem of existence
In this section, we state and prove the theorem of existence of an active Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for the game kΓ. Before to do so, we introduce some additional
notions and we prove some lemmas. Following Dubey and Shubik (1978), in order
to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we introduce the perturbed
strategic market game kΓ
, the function xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ), and the set Y
i(s−i, ).5
The perturbed strategic market game kΓ
 is a game defined as kΓ with the only
exception that the price vector p(s) becomes
pj(s) =
b¯j + 
q¯j + 
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with  > 0. The interpretation is that an outside agency
places a fixed bid of  and a fixed offer of  in each trading post. This does not
change the strategy sets of traders, but does affect the prices, the final holdings,
and the payoffs. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and fix
the strategies s−i for all other traders. Let
xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) = w
i
0 −
∑
j 6=0,t
(b¯ij + )x
i
j
q¯j + − xij
+
(b¯t + )(w
i
t − xit)
q¯it + + w
i
t − xit
and let
Y i(s−i, ) =
{
(xi1, x
i
2, . . . ) ∈ X : xit = wit − qit, xij = bij
q¯j + 
b¯ij + b
i
j + 
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for each si ∈ Si
}
,
with q¯it = q¯t − qit and b¯ij = b¯j − bij. The function xi0(xi1, xi2, . . . ) can be easily
obtained by the function xi0(s
i) in (2.1) by relabelling the variables. Furthermore,
5Dubey and Shubik (1978) denotes the set Y i(s−i, ) with Di(Q,B, ).
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it is straightforward to verify that this function is strictly concave since it is a sum
of concave and strictly concave functions. In the next proposition, by following
the proof in Appendix A of Dubey and Shubik (1978), we prove that Y i(s−i, ) is
a convex set.
Proposition 1. The set Y i(s−i, ) is convex.
Proof. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and fix the strategies
s−i for all other traders. Take two commodity bundles x′i, x′′i ∈ Y i(s−i, ) and
consider x˜i = αx′i + (1 − α)x′′i, with α ∈ (0, 1). We want to show that x˜i ∈
Y i(s−i, ). Hence, there must exist a strategy s˜i ∈ Si such that xi(s˜i) = x˜i. Let
x′i = xi(s′i) and x′′i = xi(s′′i). Consider first the commodity t. It is straightforward
to verify that x˜it = x
i
t(αq
′i
t + (1 − α)q′′it ). Consider now a commodity j 6= t. By
equation (2.2), the function xij(b
i
j) is concave in b
i
j, then
x˜ij = αx
′i
j + (1− α)x′′ij = αxij(b′ij ) + (1− α)xij(b′′ij ) ≤ xij(αb′ij + (1− α)b′′ij ) = x∗ij .
By the intermediate value theorem and since setting b′ij = 0 and b
′′i
j = 0 would make
x∗ij = 0, we may reduce b
′i
j and b
′′i
j appropriately to get x˜
i
j, for each j ∈ J \{0}.
In the next lemma, we prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
the perturbed game.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, for each  > 0, there exists a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for kΓ
.
Proof. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i and fix the strategies s−i
for all other traders. In the perturbed game the payoff function pii is continuous
because it is a composition of continuous functions (see Theorem 17.23, p. 566 in
Aliprantis and Border (2006), AB hereafter). By Tychonoff Theorem (see Theorem
2.61, p. 52 in AB), Si is compact. By Weierstrass Theorem (see Corollary 2.35, p.
40 in AB), there exists a strategy sˆi that maximises the payoff function. We then
consider the best response correspondence φi : S−i → Si. Since Si is a non-empty
and compact Hausdorff space, by Berge Maximum Theorem (see Theorem 17.31,
p. 570 in AB), φi is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
We show now that φi is a continuous function. Suppose that there are two
feasible commodity bundles x′i and x′′i that maximise the utility function. Consider
the commodity bundle x˜ii =
1
2
x′i + 1
2
x′′i. Since the utility function is concave,
ui(x˜i) ≥ 1
2
ui(x′i) + 1
2
ui(x′′i) = ui(x′i). Since xi0(x
i
1, x
i
2, . . . ) is strictly concave and
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Y i(s−i, ) is convex, there exists a γ > 0 such that x˜i+γe0 is a feasible allocation6.
But then, since the utility function is strictly increasing in xi0, u
i(x˜i+γe0) > u
i(x′i),
a contradiction. Therefore, there is only one commodity bundle that maximises the
utility function and φi is a single valued correspondence. Hence, φi is a continuous
function (see Lemma 17.6, p.559 in AB).
As we are looking for a fixed point in the strategy space S, let’s consider
φi : S → Si. Let Φ : S → S such that Φ(S) = ∏i∈I φi(S). The function Φ is
continuous since it is a product of continuous functions (see Theorem 17.28, p.
568 in AB). By Tychonoff Theorem, S is compact. Moreover, S is a non-empty
and convex Hausdorff space. Therefore, by Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem
(see Corollary 17.56, p. 583 in AB), there exists a fixed point sˆ of Φ, which is a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game kΓ
.
In the next lemma, we prove that all traders make positive bids on the com-
modities which are desired at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game kΓ
, bˆij > 0,
for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Consider,
without loss of generality, a trader i. First, suppose that bˆil = 0, for an l ∈ Li, and∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0. Consider a strategy s
′i such that b′il = bˆ
i
l + γ, with γ sufficiently
small, and all other actions equal to the actions of the original strategy sˆi. Since
limxil→0
∂ui
∂xil
= ∞, ui(xi(s′i, sˆ−i)) > ui(xi(sˆi, sˆ−i)), a contradiction. Now, suppose
that bˆil = 0, for an l ∈ Li, and
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j = w
i
0. Then, there exists a commodity m
such that bˆim > 0. Consider a strategy s
′i such that b′im = bˆ
i
m−γ, b′il = bˆil+γ, with γ
sufficiently small, and all other actions equal to the actions of the original strategy
sˆi. Since limxil→0
∂ui
∂xil
=∞, ui(xi(s′i, sˆ−i)) > ui(xi(sˆi, sˆ−i)), a contradiction. Hence,
bˆij > 0, for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
In the next lemma, we prove that all commodities are offered in the trading
posts at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game kΓ
, ¯ˆqj > 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Consider,
without loss of generality, a trader i of type t. Then, sˆi solves the following max-
6ej is an infinite vector in `∞ whose jth component is 1, and all others are 0.
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imisation problem
max
si
pii(si, sˆ−i),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. (iv)
(2.3)
The constraints can be written as a function G : `∞ → Z, with Z ⊂ `∞. It
is straightforward to verify that Z contains a positive cone P with a non-empty
interior and G is Fre´chet differentiable. We now show that there exists an h ∈ `∞
such that G(sˆi)+G′(sˆi)h < 0, with G′ the Fre´chet derivative of G. In matrix form,
it becomes 
qˆit − wit∑
j 6=t bˆ
i
j − wi0
−qˆit
−bˆi1
−bˆi2
. . .

+

ht∑
j 6=t hj
−ht
−h1
−h2
. . .

<

0
0
0
0
0
. . .

.
First, suppose that the constraints (i) and (ii) are not binding. Consider a vector
h with hj = 0, for each j such that bˆ
i
j > 0, and hj positive and sufficiently small,
for all other j. But then, sˆi is a regular point. Now, suppose that the constraints
(i) and (ii) are binding. Consider a vector h with hj positive and sufficiently small,
for each j such that bˆij = 0, and hj negative and sufficiently small, for all other
j. But then, sˆi is a regular point. If either constraint (i) or (ii) is binding the
previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same result. Hence, sˆi is a
regular point of the constrained set. Finally, since the game is perturbed and the
utility function is continuously Fre´chet differentiable, pii is continuously Fre´chet
differentiable. Hence, we have proved that all the hypothesis of the Generalized
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied (see Appendix 2.A). Therefore, there exist
non-negative multipliers λˆi∗1 and µˆ
i∗
t such that
∂pii
∂qit
(sˆi, sˆ−i)− λˆi∗1 + µˆi∗t = 0, (2.4)
λˆi∗1 (qˆ
i
t − wit) = 0,
µˆi∗t qˆ
i
t = 0.
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Since the payoff function is defined as pii(s) = ui(xi(s)), equation (2.4) becomes
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
¯ˆ
bt + 
¯ˆqit + qˆ
i
t + 
(
1− qˆ
i
t
¯ˆqit + qˆ
i
t + 
)
− ∂u
i
∂xit
(xi(sˆ))− λˆi∗1 + µˆi∗t = 0. (2.5)
Suppose that ¯ˆqt = 0. Then, qˆ
i
t = 0, for each trader i of type t, and λˆ
i∗
1 = 0. Hence,
the equation above becomes
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
bˆt + 

− ∂u
i
∂xit
(xi(sˆ)) + µˆi∗t = 0.
Since
¯ˆ
bt+

> 1, by Lemma 2, and ∂u
t
∂xtt
(xt) ≤ ∂ut
∂xt0
(xt) for each xt such that xtt = w
t
t,
by Assumption 4, then the left hand side of the equation is greater than zero, a
contradiction. Hence, ¯ˆqj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
By Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, there exists an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
the perturbed game. In the next lemma, we prove that the price vector lies in
a compact set bounded away from zero, for any , at an active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. Since the number of commodities is infinite, we could not apply the
analogous lemma of Dubey and Shubik (1978).
Lemma 4. At an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game kΓ
,
there exist two positive constants, independent from , Cj and Dj such that
Cj < p

j(sˆ) < Dj,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Moreover, Cj is uniformly bounded away from zero and Dj
is uniformly bounded from above.
Proof. Let sˆ be an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. With-
out loss of generality, let j = l. We first establish the existence of Cl. Since
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is active, there exists a trader i of type l such that
qˆil > 0. Then, a decrease γ in i’s offer of commodity l is feasible, with 0 < γ ≤ qˆil ,
and has the following incremental effects on the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil − γ)
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + − γ
− qˆil
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
,
=
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
(
(qˆil − γ)
¯ˆql + 
¯ˆql + − γ
− qˆil
)
≥ −pl (sˆ)γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = γ.
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The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that ¯ˆql +  > ¯ˆql + − γ.
Then, we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ)− pl (sˆ)γe0 + γel.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we
obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ − ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))pl (sˆ)γ +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))γ +O(γ2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative
and then
pl (sˆ) >
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) = Cl.
By Assumption 4(i), Cl ≥ λf . Then, Cj ≥ λf , for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Now, we
establish the existence of Dl. Since there are at least two traders of each type, we
consider a trader i of type l such that qˆil ≤
¯ˆql
2
. We need to consider two cases.
First, suppose that qˆil < w
i
l . Then, an increase γ in i’s offer of commodity l is
feasible, with 0 < γ < min{wil − qˆil , }, and has the following incremental effects
on the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = (qˆil + γ)
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + + γ
− qˆil
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
,
=
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆql + 
¯ˆqil + 
¯ˆqil + qˆ
i
l + + γ
γ ≥ 1
3
pl (sˆ)γ,
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) = −γ.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that qˆil ≤ ¯ˆqil +  and
γ ≤ ¯ˆqil + . Then, we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ) + 1
3
pl (sˆ)γe0 − γel.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we
obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
1
3
pl (sˆ)γ −
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))γ +O(γ2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the inequality is negative
and then
pl (sˆ) < 3
(
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
)
= D1l .
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By Assumption 4(i), D1l ≤ 3fλ . Now, suppose that qˆil = wil . Then,
pl (sˆ) <
ke
wil
= D2l ,
with ke the total endowment of commodity money in the economy. By Assumption
1, D2l ≤ keσ . Finally, we choose Dl such that Dl = max{D1l , D2l }. Hence, Dj is
uniformly bounded from above as D1j and D
2
j are uniformly bounded from above,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
In the next lemma, we prove that there exists a positive lower bound, indepen-
dent from , for each bid made by a trader on a desired commodity at an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5. At an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game kΓ
,
there exists a positive constant Bij, independent of , such that
0 < Bij ≤ bˆij,
for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let sˆ be an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Con-
sider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t. Then, sˆi solves the maximi-
sation problem in (2.3). As in the proof of Lemma 3, all the hypothesis of the
Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied and then there exist non-negative
multipliers λˆi∗2 and µˆ
i∗
j , for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, such that
∂pii
∂bij
(sˆi, sˆ−i)− λˆi∗2 + µˆi∗j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (2.6)
λˆi∗2
(∑
j 6=0,t
bˆij − wi0
)
= 0,
µˆi∗j bˆ
i
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
Consider, without loss of generality, a commodity l ∈ Li. Since the payoff function
is defined as pii(s) = ui(xi(s)), equation (2.6) becomes
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
¯ˆql + 
¯ˆ
bil + bˆ
i
l + 
(
1− bˆ
i
l
¯ˆ
bil + bˆ
i
l + 
)
− λˆi∗2 + µˆi∗j = 0. (2.7)
By Lemma 4 and since sˆ is an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, we obtain the
following inequality from the previous equation
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
1
Dl
( ¯ˆ
bil + 
¯ˆ
bil + bˆ
i
l + 
)
− λˆi∗2 ≤ 0. (2.8)
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Suppose that bˆil → 0. Then, limbˆil→0
¯ˆ
bil+
¯ˆ
bil+bˆ
i
l+
= 1 and limbˆil→0
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ)) = ∞, as
l ∈ Li. But then, since ∂ui
∂xi0
(xi) and Dl are bounded from above, the left hand side
of the inequality is positive, a contradiction. Hence, there exists a positive lower
bound Bij, independent of , at which the left hand side of equation (2.8) is equal
to zero, for each j ∈ Li, for each i ∈ I.
We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, there exists an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for kΓ.
Proof. Consider a sequence of {g}∞g=1 converging to 0. By Lemmas 1, 2, and 3,
in each perturbed game there exists an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then,
we can consider a sequence of active Cournot-Nash equilibria {gsˆ}∞g=1 associated
to the sequence of . As proved before, S is compact and, by Lemma 4, p(gsˆ) ∈∏
j 6=0[Cj, Dj] with Cj uniformly bounded away from zero andDj uniformly bounded
from above, for each j ∈ J \{0}. By Tychonoff Theorem, ∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj] is compact.
Then, we can pick a subsequence of {gsˆ}∞g=1 that converges to v such that v ∈ S
and p(v) ∈ ∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj]. Hence, v is a point of continuity of payoff functions
and then it is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, i.e., vˆ. It remains to prove that vˆ is
an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By Assumption 5 and Lemma 5, for each
commodity j ∈ J \ {0}, ¯ˆbj ≥ Bij > 0, for a trader i such that j ∈ Li. Suppose,
without loss of generality, that there exists a commodity l such that ¯ˆql = 0. But
then, pl(vˆ) /∈ [Cl, Dl], a contradiction. Therefore, ¯ˆqj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, and
then vˆ is an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Asymptotic oligopolies and asymptotic price takers
In this section, we analyse traders’ market power at an active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of the game kΓ. We study it by introducing the definitions of asymp-
totic oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker. These concepts allow us to extend
the study of traders who can influence prices from finite to infinite economies.
In fact, differently from the finite case, if a trader is active on an infinite num-
ber of commodities, he can keep market power on an infinite set of them or his
market power can vanish along their sequence. We also provide some examples
to illustrate these two notions and to show that the distinction is not trivial in
our framework. Example 1 and 2 show economies with asymptotic oligopolists
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and asymptotic price-takers respectively. Example 3 shows that, perhaps surpris-
ingly, even if the number of traders active in each trading post is not uniformly
bounded from above, there are traders “big enough”, in terms of initial endowment
of commodity money, who are asymptotic oligopolists. This example also helps to
understand heuristically under which conditions an asymptotic oligopolist exists.
Finally, Example 4 shows why an asymptotic oligopolist can heuristically be seen
as a global oligopolist and an asymptotic price-taker as a local one. We start our
analysis by discussing a possible interpretation of the infinity of commodities and
by defining an index to measure traders’ market power.
It is straightforward to see that the mathematical structure of the exchange
economy described in Section 2.2 is similar to an overlapping generation model
(see Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980), Wilson (1981), and Burke (1988), among
others). As remarked in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) “The countably
infinite index of commodities need not to refer to calendar time. Location or
any other characteristic suffice to give rise to economies analytically equivalent to
economies of overlapping generations”. Therefore, the infinite set of commodities
can be interpreted as commodities in different locations or as a set of differentiated
commodities respect to particular attribute. The next figure shows a possible
arrangement of commodities on a Hotelling line. As the diagram makes clear,
A
1
B
2 3 4 5 ...
commodity 1 is at the origin of the line, commodity 2 is in the middle of the line,
commodity 3 is in the middle of the second half, and so on.
We measure traders’ market power by using their market share in each trading
post. Therefore, on the offers side, the market power of a trader i of type t on the
commodity he holds can be measured by qit/q¯t. The higher this ratio is, the higher
is the market power of trader i. By Assumption 1, each commodity is offered by
k traders and then each trader always keeps market power on the commodity held
for any finite k. Similarly, on the bids side, the market power of a trader i of type
t on a commodity j, with j 6= t, can be measured by the ratio bij/b¯j. If bij = 0,
we say that trader i is a trivial price-taker on commodity j. Okuno et al. (1980)
used a different way to measure traders’ market power in strategic market games.
They introduce the notions of marginal price and average price and they show that
when the two prices are equal traders behave competitively. In Appendix 2.B, we
show that our approach is equivalent to the one used by Okuno et al. (1980).
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We now introduce the definitions of an asymptotic oligopolist and an asymptotic
price-taker.
Definition 4. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ in which there exists
a trader i such that bˆij > 0 for an infinite number of commodities. We say that
trader i is an asymptotic price-taker if limj→∞ bˆij/
¯ˆ
bj = 0, otherwise trader i is an
asymptotic oligopolist.
The key feature of an asymptotic oligopolist is that his market power is greater than
a positive constant on an infinite subset of commodities. Differently, an asymptotic
price-taker i is a trader such that, for any µ > 0, there exists a l ∈ J such that
bij/b¯j < µ, for each j > l, i.e., his market power is smaller than µ on an infinite
set of commodities, with µ arbitrary small. Therefore, an asymptotic price-taker
is characterised by a mixed behaviour because his market power is greater than
a positive constant on a finite set of commodities while it can be made arbitrary
small on infinite sets of commodities.
To simplify computations, in all examples we consider logarithmic additive
utility functions linear in commodity money and in the commodity held by the
trader, i.e., x0+xt+
∑
j βj lnxj.
7 The coefficient βj converts the utilities associated
with the consumption of commodities into commodity money. Furthermore, in the
examples we consider only type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria and then all
superscripts denote types of traders.
In the first example, we show an exchange economy in which at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Example 1. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + δ
3 lnx23 w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 + δ
4 lnx34 w
3 =
(
δ2
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + δ
t+1 lnxtt+1 w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
7Logarithmic utility functions facilitate computations but are not continuous at the boundary.
Therefore, they violate Assumption 4. This does not affect the current analysis but should be
kept in mind.
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with δ ∈ (0, 1). The type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
kΓ associated to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ1G(1)2, δ2G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(2), . . .
)
,(
qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ2G(1)2, δ1G(1), δ3G(2), 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,(
qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, bˆ
3
5, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2δ3G(1)G(2), 0, 0, δ4G(2), 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,(
qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, bˆ
t
t+2, . . .
)
=
(
2δtG(1)G(2), 0, . . . , 0, δt+1G(2), 0, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with G(y) =
(
1 − 1
yk
)
. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium, type 1
traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in a trading post for commodity j ≥ 3
only types of traders 1 and j− 1 are active and they both bid the same amount of
commodity money. Therefore, the market power of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/
¯ˆ
bj, is equal
to 1
2k
, for j ≥ 3. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/¯ˆbj = 12k .
In this example, type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists because in equilibrium
there are only two types of traders active in each trading post and all of them make
the same bid. Heuristically, type 1 traders keep market power on all commodities
because bids and markets’ size shrink together along the sequence of commodities.
In the next example, we show an exchange economy in which at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium type 1 traders are asymptotic price-takers.
Example 2. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 +
∞∑
j=3
δj lnx2j w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 +
∞∑
j=4
δj lnx3j w
3 =
(
δ2
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t +
∞∑
j=t+1
δj lnxtj w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
with δ ∈ (0, 1). The type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
kΓ associated to the exchange economy is(
qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ1G(1)2, δ2G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),(
qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
δ2G(1)2, δ1G(1), δ3G(2), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),
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(
qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2δ3G(1)G(2), 0, 0, δ4G(3), . . . , δjG(j − 1), . . . ),(
qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . .
)
=
(
(t− 1)δtG(1)G(t− 1), 0, . . . , 0, δt+1G(t), . . . ),
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with G(y) =
(
1 − 1
yk
)
. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium, all
traders are asymptotic price-takers.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in a trading post for commodity j ≥
3 there are j − 1 types of traders active and all of them bid the same amount
of commodity money. Therefore, the market power of type t traders active on
commodity j, bˆtj/
¯ˆ
bj, is equal to
1
(j−1)k , for j ≥ 2. Hence, limj→∞ bˆtj/
¯ˆ
bj = 0, for
t = 1, 2, . . . .
In this example, in each trading post all traders types make the same bid and their
number is strictly increasing. Therefore, the bids of each trader become negligible
in comparison to the bids of all others along the sequence of commodities and then
everyone is an asymptotic price-taker. A key difference with Example 1 is that the
number of traders types active in each trading post is not uniformly bounded from
above and this counteracts type 1 traders’ market power. As remarked above, even
if the market power of all traders vanishes along the sequence of commodities, each
of them keeps market power on the commodity in the endowment since qtt/q¯t = 1/k,
for t = 1, 2, . . . . A different result is obtained if there exists a type of trader that
places higher bids than other traders along the sequence of commodities.
In the next example, we show an exchange economy where there are asymp-
totic oligopolists even if the number of traders active in each trading post is not
uniformly bounded from above.
Example 3. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
1
j2
lnx1j , w
1 =
(
pi2
6
, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 +
∞∑
j=3
δj lnx2j w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 +
∞∑
j=4
δj lnx3j w
3 =
(
δ2
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t +
∞∑
j=t+1
δj lnxtj w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
.
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For k = 2 and δ = 1/3, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
the game kΓ associated to the exchange economy is
(
qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . .
)
=
(
1
12
,
1
8
,
√
13− 1
36
, . . . ,
(2j + 1)j2 − 3j − F (j)
4j2 (j2 − 3j) , . . .
)
,
(
qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . .
)
=
(
1
16
,
1
6
,
7−√13
108
, . . . , bˆj, . . .
)
,
(
qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . .
)
=
(
2 +
√
13
108
, 0, 0,
227−√4729
14040
, . . . , bˆj, . . .
)
,
(
qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . .
)
=
(
(2j − 5)j2 + 3j + F (j)
3j8j2
, 0, . . . , 0, bˆj, . . .
)
,
with bˆj =
(5−2j)j2+3j(4j−7)−F (j)
3j4(j−2)(3j−j2) and F (y) =
√
(5− 2y)2y4 + 3y2y2(6y − 11) + 9y,
for t = 4, 5, . . . . At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium, type 1 traders are asymptotic
oligopolists.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/bˆj,
is equal to (2j−5)j
2+3j+1−F (j)
4(3j−j2) , for each j ≥ 3. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/bˆj = 12 .
In this example, type 1 traders are again asymptotic oligopolists because in each
trading post they place sufficiently higher bids and therefore their bids do not
become negligible respect to other traders’ bids. Heuristically, a trader, with a
higher initial endowment of commodity money and a sequence of utility coefficients
that converges to zero slowly enough, can be an asymptotic oligopolist even if
the number of traders active in each trading post is not uniformly bounded from
above. In Example 3, indeed, type 1 traders have an higher initial endowment of
commodity money than in the previous examples and the sequence { 1
j2
} converges
to zero slower that the sequence {δj}.
In the next example, we show why the notions of asymptotic oligopolist and
asymptotic price-taker are defined by using limits instead of limit points.
Example 4. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, s ≥ 3
odd, and t ≥ 4 even have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + δ
3 lnx23 w
2 =
(
δ1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
us(xs) = xs0 + x
s
s +
1
(s+ 1)2
lnxss+1 w
s =
(
1
(s− 1)2 , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
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ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + δ
t+1 lnxtt+1 w
t =
(
δt−1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
.
For k = 2 and δ = 1/3, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
the game kΓ associated to the exchange economy is
(bˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , bˆ
1
j+1, . . . ) =
(
1
12
,
1
18
,
1
36
, . . . ,
6
3j5− j2 + F (j) ,
3
3j+14
, . . .
)
,
(qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
1
36
,
1
6
,
1
36
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(qˆss, bˆ
s
1, . . . , bˆ
s
s−1, bˆ
s
s+1, . . . ) =
(
3
3s4
, 0, . . . , 0,
6
5(s+ 1)2 − 3s+1 + F (s+ 1) , 0, . . .
)
,
(qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . . ) =
(
t2 + 3t + F (t)
3t8t2
, 0, . . . , 0,
3
3t+14
, 0, . . .
)
,
for s ≥ 3 odd and t ≥ 4 even, with F (y) = √y4 + 3y14y2 + 9y. At this Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/
¯ˆ
bj,
is equal to 1
4
, for each j ≥ 3 odd, and to 2j2
3j2+F (j)+3j
, for each j ≥ 4 even. Hence,
the sequence of market power has two limit points 1
4
and 0.
In this example, the sequence of market power has two different limit points and
even if one of them is zero, type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists because there
is an infinite number of commodities on which their market power is greater than a
positive constant. These traders can be seen as global oligopolists precisely because
their market power is uniformly bounded away from zero on an infinite subset of
commodities. In the definition of asymptotic price-takers, we have used the notion
of limit to rule out such traders who have a market power uniformly bounded away
from zero on odd commodities and which converges to zero on the even ones. By
doing so, an asymptotic price-taker can be seen as a local oligopolist because his
market power is greater than a positive constant on a finite set of commodities
while it is vanishing on the tail of the sequence of commodities.
2.5 Convergence to the Walras equilibrium
In this section, we consider the relationship between the Walras equilibrium of
the exchange economy and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the strategic market
game. We show that if the number of traders of each type tends to infinity then
the price vector and the allocation, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, converge to
the Walras equilibrium of the underlying exchange economy.
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Our framework is a particular case of the one considered by Wilson (1981) and it
is straightforward to verify that under our assumptions a Walras equilibrium exists.
This result relies crucially on the fact that there is a finite aggregate endowment
of all commodities. We can then compare the Cournot-Nash equilibrium with the
case in which all traders behave competitively, i.e., the Walras equilibrium. From
the analysis of traders’ market power in the previous section, it follows that the
price vector and the allocation at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium do not coincide with
the Walras equilibrium. In fact, even when the market power of asymptotic price-
takers vanishes along the sequence of commodities, all traders continue to keep
market power on the offers side.
Before to state the convergence theorem, we need to introduce some further
notation, a definition, and a lemma. We denote by ksˆ a type symmetric Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of the game kΓ. To each ksˆ can be associated a vector ks˜ which
associates a strategy to each type of trader, i.e., ks˜ ∈
∏∞
t=1 S
t and ks˜
t = ksˆ
t, for
t = 1, 2, . . . . We denote by p(ks˜) and hx(ks˜) a price vector and an allocation of an
exchange economy hE such that p(ks˜) = p(ksˆ) and xt(ks˜) = xt(ksˆ), for t = 1, 2, . . . ,
and all h traders of type t have the same final holding xt(ks˜). In the next definition,
we introduce the notion of marginal price vector.8
Definition 5. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of kΓ. The marginal
price vector for a trader i of type t, p¯i(sˆ), is such that
p¯it(sˆ) = pt(sˆ)
(
1− qˆ
i
t
¯ˆqt
)
and p¯ij(sˆ) = pj(sˆ)
(
1 +
bˆij
¯ˆ
bij
)
, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
The following lemma is the analogous of Lemma 4 of Dubey and Shubik (1978)
for a setting with infinitely many commodities.
Lemma 6. At an interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium ksˆ of
the game kΓ, a trader i of type t maximises his payoff at the fixed marginal price
vector p¯i(ksˆ), for each i ∈ I.
Proof. Let ksˆ be an interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
the game kΓ. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t and the
following maximisation problem
max
ksi
pii(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)),
subject to qit ≤ wit, (i)
(2.9)
8This definition is equivalent to the one of Okuno et al. (1980) only if the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is such that 0 < qˆit < w
i
t, bˆ
i
j > 0, for j ∈ J \{0, t}, and
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0, for each i ∈ I.
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∑
j 6=0,t
bij ≤ wi0, (ii)
− qit ≤ 0, (iii)
− bij ≤ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, (iv)
with pii(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)) a payoff function at which the price vector is fixed and equal to
p¯i(ksˆ). Let x
i(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)) denote the commodity bundle of trader i when he plays
ks
i and the price vector is fixed and equal to p¯i(ksˆ). As in the proof of Lemma 3,
all the hypothesis of the Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem are satisfied and then,
if a ks
i solves the maximisation problem, there exist non-negative multipliers λi∗1 ,
λi∗2 and µ
i∗
j , for j ∈ J \ {0}, such that
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)))p¯
i
t(ksˆ)−
∂ui
∂xit
(xi(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)))− λi∗1 + µi∗t = 0, (2.10)
λi∗1 (q
i
t − wit) = 0,
µi∗t q
i
t = 0,
− ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ))) +
∂ui
∂xij
(xi(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)))
1
p¯ij(ksˆ)
− λi∗2 + µi∗j = 0, (2.11)
λi∗2
(∑
j 6=0,t
bij − wi0
)
= 0,
µi∗j b
i
j = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
By using the definition of marginal price vector, it is straightforward to verify that
equations (2.5) and (2.7) become (2.10) and (2.11) respectively. But then, ksˆ
i, λˆi∗1 ,
λˆi∗2 , and µˆ
i∗
j , for j ∈ J \ {0}, satisfy the first order conditions associated to the
maximisation problem (2.9). Since the utility function is concave and prices are
fixed, the payoff function pii(ks
i, p¯i(ksˆ)) is concave. Hence, ksˆ
i is optimal for the
maximisation problem (2.9).9
We now state and prove the convergence theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider a sequence of games {kΓ}∞k=2. Suppose that there exists a
sequence of interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibria, {ksˆ}∞k=2, such
that the sequences {ks˜}∞k=2 and {p(ks˜)}∞k=2 converge to v˜ and to p(v˜), respectively.
Then, the pair (p(v˜), hx(v˜)) is a Walras equilibrium of the exchange economy as-
sociated to the game hΓ, for any h.
9This conclusion can be also obtained by Theorem 2 of Section 8.5 and Lemma 1 of Section
8.7 in Luenberger (1969).
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Proof. Let {kΓ}∞k=2 be a sequence of games kΓ. Assume that there exists a sequence
of interior type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibria {ksˆ}∞k=2 such that the
sequences {ks˜}∞k=2 and {p(ks˜)}∞k=2 converge to v˜ and to p(v˜) respectively. Con-
sider, without loss of generality, a trader i of type t. By Lemma 6, ksˆ
i solves the
maximisation problem (2.9), for any k, and, since ksˆ
i is an interior type symmetric
active Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the constraints (ii) and (iii) are not binding. Let
p¯0(ksˆ) = 1, for any k.
10 It is straightforward to verify that xi(ksˆ
i, p¯i(ksˆ)) belongs
to the budget set at price p¯i(ksˆ), B
i(p¯i(ksˆ)), for any k. Now, suppose that there
exists a commodity bundle x′i ∈ Bi(p¯i(ksˆ)) such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi(ksˆi, p¯i(ksˆ))).
Since the utility function is non-decreasing, x′ij > x
i
j(ksˆ
i, p¯i(ksˆ)), for at least one
commodity j. But since
∑
j 6=0,t bˆ
i
j < w
i
0 and −qˆit < 0, there exists a feasible strategy
ks
′i ∈ Si such that xij(ks′i, p¯i(ksˆ)) = x′ij , a contradiction. Hence, the commodity
bundle xi(ksˆ
i, p¯i(ksˆ)) maximises the utility function on B
i(p¯i(ksˆ)), for each i ∈ I,
for any k. Now, consider the sequence of marginal price vectors {p¯t(ks˜)}∞k=2, for
a representative trader of type t. By the assumptions of Theorem 2 and by the
definition of marginal price vector, limk→∞ p¯tj(ks˜) = pj(v˜), for each j ∈ J \ {0}, for
t = 1, 2, . . . . Since sˆ is a type symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium, D2j in Lemma
4 becomes e
σ
. Then, Cj and Dj are independent from k, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. But
then, by Lemma 4, p(v˜) ∈∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj]. Therefore, v˜ is a point of continuity of the
payoff function and then the commodity bundle xt(v˜) is optimal on Bt(p(v˜)), for
t = 1, 2, . . . . Hence, (p(v˜), hx(v˜)) is a Walras equilibrium for the exchange economy
associated to hΓ, for any h.
It is worth to note that Theorem 2 holds for all the examples in the previous
section.
2.6 An infinity of commodity money
In all the previous sections, we have considered exchange economies with a
finite aggregate endowment of commodity money. Since in the strategic market
game commodity money is used as a medium of exchange, it is also useful to
consider the case in which the aggregate initial endowment of commodity money
is infinite. In this section, we first prove the existence of an active Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for a strategic market game kΓ with an infinite amount of commodity
money. We then show by two examples that also in such framework there are
10With a slight abuse of notation, p¯(ksˆ) denotes also a marginal price vector in which the first
element is p¯0(ksˆ).
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both asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takers. We conclude the section
by considering an interesting example in which, at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
all traders consume all commodities and all of them are asymptotic price-takers.
Finally, in this setting, the market clearing condition for commodity money does
not hold and then a Walras equilibrium does not exist.
We make the following new assumptions.
Assumption 7. Let σ and e be positive constants such that σ < e. The initial
endowment of a type t trader is such that σ < wt0 < e, σ < w
t
t < e, and w
t
j = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
Assumption 8. Let a be a positive constant. A commodity j is desired by at
least one type of trader and there are no more than a types of traders for which
the utility function is increasing respect to the variable xj, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Assumption 9. The consumption set X is a subset of the space of non-negative
bounded sequences `+∞ endowed with the product topology, i.e., X = {x ∈ `+∞ :
supj |xj| < ake}.
Assumption 7 formalises the notion of multilateral oligopoly and guarantees
that the total endowment of each commodity except commodity money is uni-
formly bounded from above. Assumption 8 ensures that all commodities are con-
sumed by a finite number of types of traders. We need a uniform upper bound on
the number of traders who desire each commodity because the total endowment of
commodity money is infinite. Assumption 9 imposes restrictions on the consump-
tion set which are standard in the literature on infinite economies. The constant
ake is the maximum amount of commodity money that a trader can receive in
exchange for the commodity he holds.
We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9, there exists an active Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for kΓ.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that under Assumptions 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9,
Lemmas 1, 2, 3, and 5 hold. Lemma 4 holds with D2l equal
aek
wil
. Therefore, by
applying the same steps in the proof of Theorem 1, we can conclude that there
exists an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a game kΓ with an infinite aggregate
endowment of commodity money.
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When there is an infinity of commodity money, each trader holds only a negli-
gible quantity of the total amount of commodity money in the economy. In such
setting, we can expect that no trader has enough money to be an asymptotic
oligopolist. The following example shows that this conjecture is false.
Example 5. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + δ lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + δ
3 lnx23 w
2 = (2, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 + δ
4 lnx34 w
3 = (2, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + δ
t+1 lnxtt+1 w
t = (2, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
with δ ∈ (0, 1). At the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the
game kΓ, type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
Proof. This exchange economy is identical to the one considered in Example 1
except for the fact that all types of traders t ≥ 2 have an initial endowment of
commodity money equal to 2. It is straightforward to verify that this does not
affect the Cournot-Nash equilibrium which is the same of Example 1. Therefore,
type 1 traders are asymptotic oligopolists.
In the next example, we show an exchange economy in which at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium type 1 traders are asymptotic price-takers.
Example 6. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + lnx
2
1 + x
2
2 + lnx
2
3 w
2 =
(
2, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 + lnx
3
4 w
3 =
(
2, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t + lnx
t
t+1 w
t =
(
2, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
with δ ∈ (0, 1). For k = 2, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the game kΓ associated to the exchange economy is
(qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . . ) =
(
1
4
,
δ2
2
,
δ3(δ3 − 5 + F (3))
4δj − 4 , . . . ,
δj(δj − 5 + F (j))
4δj − 4 , . . .
)
,
(qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
δ2
4
,
1
2
,
1− 5δ3 + F (3)
4− 4δ3 , 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
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(qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . . ) =
(
δ3 + F (3) + 1
4
, 0, 0,
1− 5δ4 + F (4)
4− 4δ4 , 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . . ) =
(
δt + F (t) + 1
4
, 0, . . . , 0,
1− 5δt+1 + F (t+ 1)
4− 4δt+1 , . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with F (y) =
√
(δy + 14)δy + 1. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
type 1 traders are asymptotic price-takers.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the market power of type 1 traders, bˆ1j/bˆj,
is equal to
3δj−
√
(δj+14)δj+1+1
4δj−4 , for each j ≥ 3. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/bˆj = 0.
In the next example, we consider an exchange economy in which all traders
desire all commodities and everyone is an asymptotic price-taker. Therefore, this
example does not satisfy Assumption 8 but nevertheless there exists a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium because traders’ preferences have a particular pattern.
Example 7. Consider an exchange economy in which traders of type 1, 2, 3, and
t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + x
1
1 +
∞∑
j=2
δj lnx1j w
1 =
(
1
1− δ , 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u2(x2) = x20 + x
2
2 + δ
2 lnx21 +
∞∑
j=3
δj−1 lnx2j w
2 =
(
1
1− δ , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
u3(x3) = x30 + x
3
3 +
2∑
j=1
δ3 lnx3j +
∞∑
j=4
δj−2 lnx3j w
3 =
(
1
1− δ , 0, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
,
ut(xt) = xt0 + x
t
t +
t−1∑
j=1
δt lnxtj +
∞∑
j=t+1
δj−t+1 lnxtj w
t =
(
1
1− δ , 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
.
For k = 2 and δ = 1/2, the type-symmetric active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
the game kΓ associated to the exchange economy is
(qˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, bˆ
1
4, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . . ) =
(
m
2
,
δ2m
δ2 +m
,
δ3m
δ3 +m
,
δ4m
δ4 +m
, . . . ,
δjm
δj +m
, . . .
)
,
(qˆ22, bˆ
2
1, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4 . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
m
2
,
δ2m
δ2 +m
,
δ2m
δ2 +m
,
δ3m
δ3 +m
. . . ,
δj−1m
δj−1 +m
, . . .
)
,
(qˆ33, bˆ
3
1, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
4, . . . , bˆ
3
t , . . . ) =
(
m
2
,
δ3m
δ3 +m
,
δ3m
δ3 +m
,
δ2m
δ2 +m
, . . . ,
δj−2m
δj−2 +m
, . . .
)
,
(qˆtt, bˆ
t
1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t+1, . . . ) =
(
m
2
,
δtm
δt +m
, . . . ,
δtm
δt +m
,
δ2m
δ2 +m
,
δ3m
δ3 +m
, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . , with m =
¯ˆ
bj ≈ 0.8415, for each j ∈ J\{0}.11 At this Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, all traders types are asymptotic price-takers.
11This approximated result was obtained with Mathematica.
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Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, given the particular structure of traders’
preferences, it is straightforward to verify that the sum of bids is the same in
each trading post and it is equal to m. Since limj→∞ bˆtj = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . ,
limj→∞ bˆtj/
¯ˆ
bj = 0, for t = 1, 2, . . . .
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have extended the analysis of non-cooperative oligopoly
to exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and traders. We have
done so by considering the strategic market game analysed by Dubey and Shubik
(1978) in a setting with a countable infinity of commodities and traders having
the structure of multilateral oligopoly. In such framework, we have proved the
existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium and its convergence to the Walras
equilibrium when the number of traders of each type tends to infinity.
To analyse traders’ market power in infinite economies, we have introduced the
notions of asymptotic oligopolist and asymptotic price-taker and we have showed,
via a number of examples, that both cases arise endogenously in equilibrium in our
framework. Therefore, the infinity of commodities and traders is not sufficient to
guarantee that all traders are “small” and display a mixed behaviour, i.e., asymp-
totic price-takers. In the previous section, we have considered exchange economies
with an infinite aggregate endowment of commodity money and by two examples
we have shown that also in this setting both asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic
price-takers arise endogenously in equilibrium.
From the examples in Section 2.4, we can draw some conclusions about the
problem of proving the existence of asymptotic oligopolists. In the first example,
we have shown that some traders are asymptotic oligopolists because, heuristically,
traders have similar preferences and only few of them are active in each trading
post. In the second example, we have shown a case in which the number of traders
active in each trading post is non uniformly bounded from above and all traders
are asymptotic price-takers. In the third example, we have shown that, even if
the number of traders active in each trading post is not uniformly bounded from
above, some traders with a higher initial endowment of commodity money and
with particular preferences can be asymptotic oligopolists. Therefore, whether or
not a trader is an asymptotic oligopolist in equilibrium is sensitive to the initial
endowment of commodity money and to the “size of the market” in each trading
post, which depends on preferences throughout traders. We leave as an open
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problem for further research the determination of sufficient conditions to prove the
existence of asymptotic oligopolists. In the next chapter, we prove the existence
of asymptotic price-takers in a strategic market game called “all for sale model”.
In Section 2.4, we have illustrated how our setting can be interpreted as a model
of oligopoly with differentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. Therefore,
this framework may be useful to get some insights on competition policy issues.
2.A Mathematical appendix
In this appendix, we describe the mathematical notions that we have used in
the chapter. The definitions and the theorems are based on Luenberger (1969) and
the page number in brackets refers to it.
Definition (`∞ spaces). The space `+∞ consists of non-negative bounded sequences.
The norm of an element x = {xi} in `+∞ is defined as ‖x‖∞ = supi |xi| (p. 29).
By assuming that the space `+∞ is endowed with the product topology, we impose
on `+∞ the norm ‖x‖∞ = supi ‖aixi‖ such that {ai} is a sequence of real number
converging to zero (see Brown and Lewis (1981)).
Definition (Transformation T ). Let X and Y be linear vector spaces and let D
be a subset of X. A rule which associates with every element x ∈ D an element
y ∈ Y is said to be a transformation from X to Y with domain D. If y corresponds
to x under T , we write y = T (x) (p. 27).
Definition (Fre´chet differentiable). Let T be a transformation defined on an open
domain D in a normed space X and having range in a normed space Y . If for fixed
x ∈ D and each h ∈ X there exists δT (x;h) ∈ Y which is linear and continuous
with respect to h such that
lim
‖h‖→0
‖T (x+ h)− T (x)− δT (x;h)‖
‖h‖ = 0,
then T is said to be Fre´chet differentiable at x and δT (x;h) is said to be the Fre´chet
differential of T at x with incremental h (p. 172).
Definition (Continuously Fre´chet differentiable). The Fre´chet differential of T
at x with incremental h, δT (x;h), can be written as T ′(x)h with T ′ the Fre´chet
derivative of T . If the correspondence x → T ′(x) is continuous at the point x0,
we say that the Fre´chet derivative of T is continuous at x0. If the derivative of
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T is continuous on some open sphere S, we say that T is continuously Fre´chet
differentiable on S (p. 175).
Definition (Normed dual). Let X be a normed linear vector space. The space of
all bounded linear function on X is called the normed dual of X and is denoted
by X∗ (p. 106).
Luenberger states the Regular Point definition (p. 248) and the Generalized
Kuhn-Tucker Theorem (p. 249-250) for vector spaces. Since we deal with normed
spaces, we state them for these particular spaces (see Example 1, p. 250).
Definition (Regular Point). Let X be a normed vector space and let Z be a
normed vector space with a closed positive cone P having non-empty interior. Let
G be a mapping G : X → Z which is Fre´chet differentiable. A point x0 ∈ X is
said to be a regular point of the inequality G(x) ≤ 0 if G(x0) ≤ 0 and there is an
h ∈ X such that G(x0) +G′(x0) · h < 0.
Theorem (Generalized Kuhn-Tucker Theorem). Let X be a normed vector space
and Z be a normed vector space having a closed positive cone P . Assume that P
contains an interior point. Let f be a Fre´chet differentiable real-valued function on
X and G a Fre´chet differentiable mapping from X into Z. Suppose x0 maximizes
f subject to G(x) ≤ 0 and that x0 is a regular point of the inequality G(x) ≤ 0.
Then there is a z∗0 ∈ Z∗, z∗0 ≥ 0 such that
f ′(x0) + z∗0G
′(x0) = 0,
z∗0 ·G(x0) = 0.
2.B Marginal and average prices
Okuno et al. (1980) introduce the notions of marginal price and average price
to study traders’ behaviours. They show that when the two prices are equal traders
behave competitively. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ, the average price vector
is equal to p(sˆ) and traders’ marginal price vectors are defined in Definition 5. The
next proposition shows, in our framework of multilateral oligopoly, the relationship
between the approach of Okuno et al. (1980) and traders’ market share, which is
used by us to measure traders’ market power.
Proposition 2. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of kΓ. For a trader
i of type t, the marginal price vector is equal to the average price vector if and
only if qˆit
/
¯ˆqt = 0 and bˆ
i
j
/¯ˆ
bj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}.
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Proof. Let sˆ be an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium of kΓ. Consider a trader i of
type t. First, assume that p¯i(sˆ) = p(sˆ). By Definition 5, qˆit/
¯ˆqt = 0 and bˆ
i
j/
¯ˆ
bij = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. But then, bˆij/¯ˆbj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. Now, assume
that qˆit/
¯ˆqt = 0 and bˆ
i
j/
¯ˆ
bj = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. This implies that bˆij = 0 and
then bˆij/
¯ˆ
bij = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, t}. By Definition 5, p¯i(sˆ) = p(sˆ).
2.C The game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978)
The game kΓ was introduced for exchange economies with a finite number of
commodities by Shubik (1973). The strategy space of this game is different from the
one considered by Dubey and Shubik (1978) where traders are allowed to sell and
buy the same commodity. We introduce now the strategic market game analysed
by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and we show how it is related to the game kΓ. Let’s
call this game Λ. The strategy set of trader i is
Zi =
{
zi = (qi1, b
i
1, q
i
2, b
i
2, . . . , q
i
j, b
i
j, . . . ) : 0 ≤ qij ≤ wij, bij ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0},
and
∞∑
j=1
bij ≤ wi0
}
.
Let Z =
∏
i∈I Z
i and Z−r =
∏
i∈I\{r} Z
i. Let z and z−i be elements of Z and Z−i
respectively. For each z ∈ Z, the price vector p(z) is such that
pj(z) =
{
b¯j
q¯j
if q¯j 6= 0,
0 if q¯j = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with q¯j =
∑
i∈I q
i
j and b¯j =
∑
i∈I b
i
j. For each z ∈ Z, the final
holding xi(z) of a trader i is such that
xi0(z) = w
i
0 −
∞∑
j=1
bij +
∞∑
j=1
qijpj(z),
xij(z) =
{
wij − qij +
bij
pj(z)
if pj(z) 6= 0,
0 if pj(z) = 0,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
The payoff function of a trader i, pii : Z → R, is such that pii(z) = ui(xi(z)).
The following proposition establishes the relationship between the attainable
allocations of the two games at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 4. Consider an exchange economy kE as defined in Section 2.2 which
satisfies Assumption 1. An allocation x is attainable at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
sˆ of the game kΓ if and only if the same allocation x is attainable at a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium zˆ of the game Λ.
Proof. Let kE be an exchange economy which satisfies Assumption 1. First, assume
that sˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game kΓ. Let zˆ be a strategy profile
such that, for a trader i of type t, zˆi = (0, bˆi1, 0, bˆ
i
2, . . . , qˆ
i
t, 0, . . . ), for each i ∈ I.
It is straightforward to verify that x(sˆ) and x(zˆ) are equal. Suppose that z is
not a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for Λ. Then, there exists a trader i of type t
that can increase his payoff by playing a strategy z′i. The only action that can
increase the trader’s payoff is to increase the bid for commodity t, b′it , because all
other feasible deviations are also available in the game kΓ. Then, x
i
t(z
′i, zˆ−i) >
xit(sˆ). But, by decreasing qˆ
i
t, the commodity bundle x
i(z′i, z−i) is attainable also
in the original game, a contradiction. Hence, zˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
for the game Λ. Now, assume that zˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game
Λ. Let sˆ be a strategy profile such that, for a trader i of type t, si = (qˆit −
bˆit
pt(sˆ)
, bˆi1, bˆ
i
2, . . . , bˆ
i
t−1, bˆ
i
t+1, . . . ), for each i ∈ I. It is straightforward to verify that
x(zˆ) and x(sˆ) are equal. Suppose that sˆ is not a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for kΓ.
Then, there exists a trader i of type t that can increase his payoff by playing a
strategy s′i. But, any possible deviation in kΓ is also available in Λ, a contradiction.
Hence, sˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for kΓ.
As a corollary of this theorem, we can extend the existence theorem to the
game Λ analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978).
Corollary 1. In an exchange economy kE as defined in Section 2.2, under As-
sumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, there exists an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium for
Λ.
Proof. Let kE be an exchange economy which satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6. By Theorem 1, there exists an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the game
kΓ associated to kE . Let x(sˆ) be the allocation at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ.
But then, by Theorem 4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium zˆ for the game
Λ such that x(zˆ) = x(sˆ).
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3Asymptotic Price-Takers in Economies with
Infinitely Many Commodities and Traders
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have introduced the notions of asymptotic oligopolist
and asymptotic price-taker to study traders’ market power in exchange economies
with a countable infinity of commodities and traders. In this chapter, we focus on
asymptotic price-takers and we study under which conditions on the fundamentals
of an economy, i.e., initial endowments and preferences, an asymptotic price-taker
exists.
As described in the previous chapter, an asymptotic price-taker is a trader who
makes positive bids on an infinite set of commodities and whose market power
converges to zero along the sequence of commodities. This trader exhibits a kind
of mixed behaviour since his market power can be made arbitrary small on an infi-
nite set of commodities while it is greater than a positive constant only on a finite
number of them. In the previous literature on imperfect competition, the mixed
behaviour was usually obtained by assuming that agents are characterised by port-
folios of commodities that contain the commodities on which agents have market
power. Negishi (1961) considered monopolistically competitive firms which have
market power on the commodities in their portfolios while they behave competi-
tively on all other commodities. In this way, he extended the theory of monopolis-
tic competition of Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) from partial to general
equilibrium. Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) and d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira,
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and Ge´rard-Varet (1997) considered exchange economies in which consumers are
characterized by portfolios of commodities to study the Cournot-Walras equilib-
rium and the Cournotian Monopolistic Competition equilibrium respectively. In all
these contributions, traders’ behaviours on each commodity are assumed a priori
without giving any formal explanation as to why a particular trader should behave
strategically on some commodities and competitively on others. In contrast, by
using strategic market games, we provide the sufficient conditions on the funda-
mentals of an economy under which asymptotic price-takers, who are traders with
a kind of mixed behaviour, arise endogenously in equilibrium.
Traders’ market power is measured by traders’ market share as in Chapter 2,
i.e., the market power of trader i on commodity j is bij/b¯j. From the examples in
Section 2.4, it is clear that the sequence of sums of bids, {b¯j}, converges always to
zero when there is a finite aggregate endowment of commodity money. Therefore,
in such framework, the existence of an asymptotic price-taker depends crucially on
the convergence rates to zero of the sequence of trader’s bids and the sequence of
sums of bids. Unfortunately, it turns out that it is a difficult task to obtain specific
convergence rates by making assumptions on the fundamentals of an economy.
In this chapter, we overcome these difficulties in the following way. We consider
exchange economies with an infinite aggregate endowment of commodity money,
as in Section 2.6, and we further simplify our analysis by considering a variation
of the strategic market game analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978), namely the
“all for sale model”, which was introduced by Shapley (1976) and Shapley and
Shubik (1977). In this model, at the start of the game all traders are required to
deposit all their commodities, except commodity money, in the appropriate trading
post in exchange for non-negotiable receipts. These receipts will be redeemed after
trade for the amount of commodity money obtained from the sale of each trader’s
commodities. Hence, the only actions available to traders are bids, amounts of
commodity money offered in exchange for other commodities.
In such framework, we prove the existence of an active Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium in which the sum of bids in each trading post is uniformly bounded away from
zero. Consequently, the proof of existence of an asymptotic price-taker reduces to
show that there exists a trader who is active on an infinite number of commodi-
ties. Indeed, if the sums of bids are uniformly bounded away from zero then the
sequence of market power, {bij/b¯j}, converges to zero as the sequence of bids of
a trader always converges to zero. As remarked above, to prove the existence of
asymptotic price-takers it is crucial to assume that the aggregate endowment of
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commodity money is infinite. Unfortunately, this rules out the existence of a Wal-
ras equilibrium, but it helps to clarify the connections between the fundamentals
of an economy and the mixed behaviour. The infinity of commodity money can be
interpreted as a limiting case where the total endowment of commodity money is
much greater than traders’ initial endowments.
Our contributions are as follows. We first prove the existence of an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which the price vector lies in a compact set uniformly
bounded away from zero. Under the assumptions of the model, this implies that
the sums of bids along trading posts are uniformly bounded away from zero at a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The fact that all commodities go into the trading posts
at the beginning of the game means that one side of the market is always active
and this simplifies the proof of existence. Furthermore, the assumptions needed to
prove the existence are somehow less restrictive than the ones made in the previous
chapter. For instance, it is not necessary to assume the structure of multilateral
oligopoly but some restrictions on traders’ marginal utilities are still necessary.1
We finally prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker. Heuristically, a trader
active on an infinite number of commodities is an asymptotic price-taker if all
markets are thick, i.e., the quantities of commodity money and commodities in all
trading posts are non-negligible. The results of the two theorems are discussed with
some examples which clarify the role of the assumptions and why it is crucial for the
existence of asymptotic price-takers that prices are uniformly bounded away from
zero. We conclude the chapter by comparing our results with the contributions
on monopolistic competition of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Hart (1985), and Pascoa
(1993).
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the mathemat-
ical model. In Section 3.3, we prove the existence theorem. In Section 3.4, we prove
the existence of an asymptotic price-taker and we discuss it by means of examples.
In Section 3.5, we draw some conclusions from our analysis and we compare our
results with some previous contributions on monopolistic competition.
3.2 Mathematical model
The set of commodities is J = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Let I be a countable set which
denotes the set of traders. This set I is partitioned in two sets T and H. The
1In finite economies, the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the all for sale model
was proved by Dubey and Shubik (1977) in a framework with exogenous uncertainty.
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consumption set is denoted by X. A commodity bundle x is a point in X with xj
the amount of commodity j. A trader i is characterized by an initial endowment,
wi ∈ X, which represents his wealth, and a utility function, ui : X → R, which
describes his preferences. An exchange economy is then a set E = {(ui, wi) : i ∈ I}.
A commodity j is desired by a trader i if ui is an increasing function of the
variable xij, for any fixed choice of the other variables. The set of commodities
desired by a trader i is denoted by Li.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Let σ, e, and g be positive constants such that σ < e. The initial
endowment of commodity money of a trader i is such that σ < wi0 < e, for each
i ∈ I. The total endowment of a commodity j is such that σ < ∑iwij < e, for
each j ∈ J \ {0}. Furthermore, a trader i is endowed with less than g different
commodities, for each i ∈ I.
Assumption 2. Let f and n be two positive constants. For each trader i ∈ T , (i)
the utility function, ui, is continuously Fre`chet differentiable, non-decreasing, and
concave; (ii) ]Li ≤ n, i.e, a trader i desires less than n commodities; (iii) ∂ui
∂xij
(xi) < f ,
for each xi ∈ X, for each j ∈ J .
Assumption 3. For each trader i ∈ H, the utility function, ui, is continuous,
non-decreasing, and concave.
Assumption 4. Let a and λ be positive constants such that λ < f . For each
commodity j ∈ J \ {0}, (i) there are less than a traders that desire commodity
j; (ii) there exist two traders s, t ∈ T such that ∂us
∂xsj
(xs), ∂u
t
∂xtj
(xt) > λ, for each
xs, xt ∈ X.
Assumption 5. The consumption set X is a subset of the space of non-negative
bounded sequences `+∞ endowed with the product topology, i.e., X = {x ∈ `+∞ :
supj |xj| ≤ aeg}.
The first assumption guarantees that the aggregate endowment of all com-
modities except commodity money is uniformly bounded away from zero and from
above. Differently, the aggregate endowment of commodity money is infinite and
this is crucial to prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker. The last part
of Assumption 1 implies that traders’ wealth is finite. Assumptions 2(i) and 2(ii)
are classical restrictions on traders’ preferences in infinite economies. Assumption
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2(iii) is trivially true when the number of commodities is finite.2 Assumptions 2
and 3 imply that traders in the set T desire only a finite number of commodities
and traders in the set H can desire an infinite number of commodities. The first
part of Assumption 4 imposes an upper bound a on the number of traders who
desire each commodity. This guarantees that the sum of bids in each trading post
is finite. The second part implies that for each commodity there are at least two
traders whose utility functions are strictly increasing respect to it. Finally, the last
assumption is common in economies with infinitely many commodities. The con-
stant aeg is the maximum amount of commodity money that a trader can receive
in exchange for the commodities he holds.
We now introduce the strategic market game Γ associated with the exchange
economy E . For each commodity j ∈ J \ {0}, there is a trading post where
commodity j is exchanged for commodity money 0. At the beginning of the game
all traders are required to deposit all of their commodities, except commodity
money, in the appropriate trading post. They receive non-negotiable receipts which
will be redeemed after trade for the amount of commodity money obtained from
the sale of each trader’s commodities. The strategy set of a trader i is
Si =
{
si = (bi1, b
i
2, b
i
3, . . . ) : b
i
j ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, and
∑
j
bij ≤ wi0
}
,
where bij is the amount of commodity money that trader i bids on commodity j.
Without loss of generality, we make the following technical assumption
Assumption 6. The set Si is a subset of `+∞ endowed with the product topology,
for each i ∈ I, i.e., Si ⊆ {si ∈ `+∞ : sup |sij| ≤ e}.
This assumption implies that Si lies in a normed space and therefore in a Hausdorff
space.
Let S =
∏
i∈I S
i and S−z =
∏
i∈I\{z} S
i. Let s and s−i be elements of S and
S−i respectively. For each s ∈ S, the price vector p(s) is such that
pj(s) =
b¯j
w¯j
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with b¯j =
∑
i∈I b
i
j and w¯j =
∑
i∈I w
i
j. By Assumption 1 and
4(ii), the sums b¯j and w¯j are finite, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. For each s ∈ S, the final
2The classical definition of differentiability excludes the case of infinite partial derivatives
along the boundary of the consumption set (see for instance Amir et al. (1990)).
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holding xi(s) of a trader i is such that
xi0(s) = w
i
0 −
∞∑
j=1
bij +
∞∑
j=1
wijpj(s), (3.1)
xij(s) =
{
bij
pj(s)
if pj(s) 6= 0,
0 if pj(s) = 0,
(3.2)
for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
The payoff function of a trader i, pii : S → R, is such that pii(s) = ui(xi(s)).
We now introduce the definitions of an active trading post, a best response
correspondence, and a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6. A trading post for a commodity j is said to be active if w¯j > 0 and
b¯j > 0, otherwise we say that the trading post is inactive.
Definition 1. The best response correspondence of a trader i is a correspondence
φi : S−i → Si such that
φi(s−i) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
pii(si, s−i),
for each s−i ∈ S−i.
Definition 2. An sˆ ∈ S is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ, if sˆi ∈ φi(sˆ−i), for
each i ∈ I.
Furthermore, we say that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is active if all trading
posts are active.
3.3 Theorem of existence
In this section, we state and prove the theorem of existence of an active Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for the game Γ such that the price vector lies in a compact set
uniformly bounded away from zero. Before to do so, we define the perturbed
strategic market game and we prove two lemmas. The perturbed strategic market
game Γ is a game defined as Γ with the only exception that the price becomes
pj(s) =
b¯j + 
w¯j
,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}, with  > 0. The interpretation is that an outside agency
places fixed bids of  in all trading posts. This does not change the strategy sets
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of traders, but does affect the prices, the final holdings, and the payoffs. In the
next lemma we prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the perturbed
game.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, for each  > 0, there exists a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for Γ.
Proof. Consider, without loss of generality, a trader i and fix the strategies s−i
for all other traders. In the perturbed game the payoff function pii is continuous
because it is a composition of continuous functions (see Theorem 17.23, p. 566 in
Aliprantis and Border (2006), AB hereafter). By Tychonoff Theorem (see Theorem
2.61, p. 52 in AB), Si is compact. By Weierstrass Theorem (see Corollary 2.35, p.
40 in AB), there exists a strategy sˆi that maximises the payoff function. We can
then consider the best response correspondence φi : S−i → Si. Since Si is a non-
empty and compact Hausdorff space, by Berge Maximum Theorem (see Theorem
17.31, p. 570 in AB), φi is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence.
We show now that φi has convex and closed-valued. Suppose that there are
two feasible strategies s′i and s′′i which belong to φi(s−i). We need to prove that
s˜i = αs′i + (1 − α)s′′i, with α ∈ (0, 1), belongs to φi(s−i). Let x′i = xi(s′i) and
x′′i = xi(s′′i). Since the utility function is concave, also the commodity bundle
x˜i = αx′i + (1 − α)x′′i maximises the utility function. By equations (3.1) and
(3.2), xi0(s
i) is linear in si and xij(s
i) is concave respect to si, for each j ∈ J \ {0}.
Therefore,
x˜i = αxi(s′i) + (1− α)xi(s′′i) ≤ xi(αs′i + (1− α)s′′i).
But then x˜i ≤ xi(s˜). Hence, s˜ belongs to φi(s−i) and then φi(s−i) has convex-
valued. By the continuity of the payoff function pii, it follows that φi has closed-
valued.
Since Si is closed and φi is upper hemicontinuous and closed-valued, φi has a
closed graph by the Closed Graph Theorem (see Theorem 17.11, p. 561 in AB).
As we are looking for a fixed point in strategy space S, let’s consider φi : S → Si.
Let Φ : S → S such that Φ(S) = ∏i∈I φi(S). Since Φ(S) is a product of correspon-
dences with closed graph and non-empty convex values, it is straightforward to
verify that the correspondence Φ has closed graph and non-empty convex values.
Moreover, S is a non-empty compact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff
space. Therefore, by Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem (see Corollary 17.55, p.
583 in AB), there exists a fixed point sˆ of Φ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the perturbed game Γ.
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In the next lemma, we prove that the price vector lies in a compact set bounded
away from zero, for any , at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of the perturbed game Γ, there exist
two positive constants, independent from , Cj and Dj such that
Cj < p

j(sˆ) < Dj,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Moreover, Cj is uniformly bounded away from zero and Dj
is uniformly bounded from above.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. Without loss of
generality, let j = l. First, we establish the existence of Dl. It is straightforward to
verify that the highest possible price is pl =
ae
σ
. Hence, Dj =
ae
σ
, for each j ∈ J\{0}.
Now, we establish the existence of Cl. By Assumption 4(ii), there are at least two
traders belonging to the set T such that ∂u
i
∂xil
(xi) > λ. Between them, consider the
trader i such that bˆil ≤
¯ˆ
bl
2
. We consider two cases. First, suppose that
∑
j 6=0 bˆ
i
j < w
i
0.
An increase γ in i’s bid for l is feasible, with 0 < γ ≤ min{wi0 −
∑
j 6=0 bˆ
i
j, }, and
has the following incremental effects on the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) =− γ + wil
¯ˆ
bl + + γ
w¯l
− wil
¯ˆ
b+ 
w¯l
,
= −γ + w
i
l
w¯l
γ ≥ −γ
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) =0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) =(bˆil + γ)
w¯l
¯ˆ
bl + + γ
− bˆil
w¯l
¯ˆ
bl + 
,
=
w¯l
¯ˆ
bl + 
¯ˆ
bil + 
¯ˆ
bil + bˆ
i
l + + γ
γ ≥ 1
3pl (sˆ)
γ,
with
¯ˆ
bij =
¯ˆ
bj − bˆij. The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that
bˆil ≤ ¯ˆbil +  and γ ≤ ¯ˆbil + . Then, we obtain the following vector inequality3
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ)− γe0 + 1
3pl (sˆ)
γel.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we
obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ − ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))γ +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
1
3pl (sˆ)
γ +O(γ2).
3ej is an infinite vector in `∞ whose jth component is 1, and all others are 0.
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Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the equation is negative and
then
pl (sˆ) >
1
3
(
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))
)
= C1l .
By Assumption 2(iii) and since ∂u
i
∂xil
(xi) > λ, C1l ≥ λf . Now, suppose
∑
j 6=0 bˆ
i
j = w
i
0.
By Assumption 2(ii), there exists a bid bˆih such that bˆ
i
h >
wi0
n
. If h = l, then
pl (sˆ) = p

h(sˆ) ≥
wi0
nw¯l
= C2l .
By Assumption 1, C2l ≥ σne . If h 6= l, then trader i can decrease bˆih by a small
γ, with 0 < γ < bˆih, and increase bˆ
i
l by the same amount, with the following
incremental effects on the final holding of trader i
xi0(sˆ(γ))− xi0(sˆ) = wil
b¯l + γ
w¯l
+ wih
b¯h − γ
w¯h
− wil
b¯l
w¯l
− wih
b¯h
w¯h
=
wil
w¯l
γ − w
i
h
w¯h
γ ≥ −w
i
h
w¯h
γ ≥ −γ
xij(sˆ(γ))− xij(sˆ) = 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0, l, h},
xil(sˆ(γ))− xil(sˆ) ≥
1
3pl (sˆ)
γ,
xih(sˆ(γ))− xih(sˆ) = (bˆih − γ)
w¯h
¯ˆ
bh + − γ
− bˆih
w¯h
¯ˆ
bh + 
,
= −
¯ˆ
bih + 
¯ˆ
bh + − γ
1
ph(sˆ)
γ ≥ − 1
ph(sˆ)
γ ≥ −nw¯h
wi0
γ.
The inequality in the preceding array follows from the fact that
¯ˆ
bh+ −γ ≥ ¯ˆbih+ .
Then, we obtain the following vector inequality
xi(sˆ(γ)) ≥ xi(sˆ)− γe0 + 1
3pl (sˆ)
γel − nw¯h
wi0
γeh.
By using a linear approximation of the utility function around the point xi(sˆ), we
obtain
ui(xi(sˆ(γ)))− ui(xi(sˆ)) ≥ − ∂u
i
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ))γ +
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
1
3pl (sˆ)
γ
− ∂u
i
∂xih
(xi(sˆ))
nw¯h
wi0
γ +O(γ2).
Since xi(sˆ) is an optimum point, the left hand side of the equation is negative and
then
pl (sˆ) >
1
3
∂ui
∂xil
(xi(sˆ))
/(
∂ui
∂xi0
(xi(sˆ)) +
nw¯h
wi0
∂ui
∂xih
(xi(sˆ))
)
= C3l .
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By Assumptions 1, 2, and since ∂u
i
∂xil
(xi) > λ, C3l ≥ 13 σσ+ne λf . Finally, we choose Cl
such that Cl = min{C1l , C2l , C3l , }. Since C1j , C2j , and C3j are uniformly bounded
away from zero, Cj is uniformly bounded above from zero, for each j ∈ J \{0}.
We now state the existence theorem.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, the game Γ has an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ such that the vector p(sˆ) is uniformly bounded away
from zero.
Proof. Consider a sequence of {g}∞g=1 converging to 0. By Lemma 1, in each
perturbed game there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, we can consider
the sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria, {gsˆ}∞g=1, associated to the sequence of
. As proved before, S is compact and, by Lemma 2, p(gsˆ) ∈ ∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj] with
Cj uniformly bounded away from zero and Dj uniformly bounded from above,
for each j ∈ J \ {0}. By Tychonoff Theorem, ∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj] is compact. Then,
we can pick a subsequence of {gsˆ}∞g=1 that converges to v such that v ∈ S and
p(v) ∈ ∏j 6=0[Cj, Dj]. Therefore, v is a point of continuity of payoff functions
and then v is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with prices uniformly bounded away
from zero. It remains to prove that vˆ is an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By
Assumption 1, w¯j ≥ σ, for each j ∈ J \ {0}. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that there exists a commodity l such that
¯ˆ
bl = 0. But then, pl(vˆ) /∈ [Cl, Dl], a
contradiction. Therefore,
¯ˆ
bj > 0, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, and then vˆ is an active
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
We have shown the existence of an active Cournot–Nash equilibrium with prices
bounded away from zero under the assumptions that there is a set of traders who
desire a finite number of commodities (Assumption 2(i)) and that marginal utilities
are uniformly bounded from above (Assumption 2(ii)). These assumptions are
crucial to prove that prices are uniformly bounded away from zero. The next two
examples clarify the role of these assumptions and show why prices converge to
zero when the two assumptions do not hold. In order to simplify the computations,
in both examples the set of traders H is empty and traders’ utility functions are
neither differentiable nor continuous at the boundary of the consumption set. This
does not affect the current analysis but should be kept in mind. In the first example,
we consider an exchange economy in which the number of commodities desired by
each trader is finite but it is not uniformly bounded from above.
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Example 1. Consider an exchange economy having as set of traders I = T =
{1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, . . . }. Trader t and t′ have the same initial endowment and utility
function. Traders 1, 2, 3, 4, and t ≥ 5 have the following utility functions and
initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 + lnx
1
1 w
1 = (1, 1, 0, . . . ),
u2(x2) = x20 + lnx
2
2 + lnx
2
3 w
2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u3(x3) = x30 +
6∑
j=4
lnx3j w
3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u4(x4) = x40 +
10∑
j=7
lnx4j w
4 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
ut(xt) = xt0 +
t+
∑t−1
i=1 i∑
j=1+
∑t−1
i=1 i
lnxtj w
t = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ).
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated to the exchange economy
is
(bˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, bˆ
1
4, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . . ) =
(
1
2
, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆ21, bˆ
2
2, bˆ
2
3, bˆ
2
4, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆ31, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
3, bˆ
3
4, bˆ
3
5, bˆ
3
6, bˆ
3
7, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . . ) =
(
0, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆ41, . . . , bˆ
4
6, bˆ
4
7, bˆ
4
8, bˆ
4
9, bˆ
4
10, bˆ
4
11, . . . , bˆ
4
j , . . . ) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆt1, . . . , bˆ
t
1+
∑t−1
i=1 i
, . . . , bˆt
t+
∑t−1
i=1 i
, . . . ) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
1
t
, . . . ,
1
t
, 0, . . .
)
.
for t = 5, 6, . . . . At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium the price vector p(sˆ) is not
uniformly bounded away from zero.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in each trading post there are two traders
active t and t′ and both of them make the same bid 1
t
. Since limj→∞
¯ˆ
bj = 0 and
w¯j = 2, for each j ∈ J \ {0}, limj→∞ pˆj(s) = 0. Hence, p(sˆ) is not uniformly
bounded away from zero.
In the next example, we consider an exchange economy in which the marginal
utilities of the desired commodities are not uniformly bounded from above when
these commodities are consumed in positive quantities.
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Example 2. Consider an exchange economy having as set of traders I = T =
{1, 1′, 2, 2′, 3, 3′, . . . }. Trader t and t′ have the same initial endowment and utility
function. Traders 1, 2, 3, 4, s ≥ 5 odd, and t ≥ 6 even have the following utility
functions and initial endowments
u1(x1) = x10 w
1 = (1, 1, 0, . . . ),
u2(x2) = x20 + 2 lnx
2
1 w
2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u3(x3) = x30 w
3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u4(x4) = x40 + lnx
4
2 + 4 lnx
4
3 w
4 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
us(xs) = xs0 w
s = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
ut(xt) = xt0 + lnx
t
t−2 + t lnx
t
t−1 w
t = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ).
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated to the exchange economy
is
(bˆs1, bˆ
s
2, . . . , bˆ
s
j , . . . ) =(0, 0, . . . , 0, . . . ),
(bˆ21, bˆ
2
2, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0, . . . ),
(bˆ41, bˆ
4
2, bˆ
4
3, bˆ
4
4, . . . , bˆ
4
j , . . . ) =
(
0,
1
4
,
3
4
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆt1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−2, bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t, . . . ) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
1
t
,
t− 1
t
, 0, . . .
)
,
for s ≥ 1 odd and t ≥ 6 even. At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium the price vector
p(sˆ) is not uniformly bounded away from zero.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in each trading post there are two traders
active t and t′ and both of them make the same bid. The price of a commodity
j odd is pj(sˆ) =
j
j+1
and the price of a commodity j even is pj(sˆ) =
1
j+2
. Then,
the subsequence of odd commodities’ prices converges to 1 while the subsequence
of even commodities’ prices converges to 0. Hence, p(sˆ) is not uniformly bounded
away from zero.
3.4 Asymptotic price-takers
We start this section by recalling the definitions of market power, asymptotic
price-taker, and asymptotic oligopolist from the previous chapter.
In the game Γ, the market power of a trader i on commodity j can be measured
by the ratio bij/b¯j. The higher this ratio is, the higher is the market power of
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trader i on commodity j. If bij = 0, we say that trader i is a trivial price-taker on
commodity j.
Definition 3. Consider an active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ in which there exists
a trader h such that bˆhj > 0 for an infinite number of commodities. We say that
trader h is an asymptotic price-taker if limj→∞ bˆhj /
¯ˆ
bj = 0, otherwise we say that
trader h is an asymptotic oligopolist.
The key features of an asymptotic price-taker are that he consumes an infinite
number of commodities and his market power converges to zero along the sequence
of commodities.
In the next theorem, we prove the existence of an asymptotic price-taker.
Theorem 2. Let E be an exchange economy which satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, and 6. If there exists a trader h ∈ H whose utility function is such that
limxhj→0
∂uh
∂xhj
= ∞, for an infinite number of commodities, then h is an asymptotic
price-taker.
Proof. By Theorem 1, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, there exists an
active Cournot-Nash equilibrium sˆ of Γ such that the vector p(sˆ) is uniformly
bounded away from zero. Let h ∈ H be a trader whose utility function is such
that limxhj→0
∂uh
∂xhj
= ∞, for an infinite number of commodities. First, suppose
that bˆhl = 0, for a commodity l such that limxhl→0
∂uh
∂xhl
= ∞, and ∑j 6=0 bˆhj < wh0 .
Consider a strategy s′h such that b′hl = bˆ
h
l +γ, with γ sufficiently small, and all other
actions equal to the actions of the original strategy sˆh. Since limxhl→0
∂uh
∂xhl
= ∞,
uh(xh(s′h, sˆ−h)) > uh(xh(sˆh, sˆ−h)), a contradiction. Now, suppose that bˆhl = 0, for
a commodity l such that limxhl→0
∂uh
∂xhl
=∞, and ∑j 6=0 bˆhj = wh0 . Then, there exists
a commodity m such that bˆhm > 0. Consider a strategy s
′h such that b′hm = bˆ
h
m − γ,
b′hl = bˆ
h
l + γ, with γ sufficiently small, and all other actions equal to the actions of
the original strategy sˆh. Since limxhl→0
∂uh
∂xhl
=∞, uh(xh(s′h, sˆ−h)) > uh(xh(sˆh, sˆ−h)),
a contradiction. Hence, bˆhj > 0, for each commodity j such that limxhj→0
∂uh
∂xhj
=∞.
Therefore, trader h makes positive bids on an infinite number of commodities and
his sequence of bids, {bˆhj }, converges to zero because his endowment of commodity
money is finite. Since p(sˆ) is bounded away from zero and the aggregate endowment
of each commodity is uniformly bounded away from zero by Assumption 1, the
sequence of sums of bids, {¯ˆbj}, is uniformly bounded away from zero. But then,
limj→∞ bˆhj /
¯ˆ
bj = 0. Hence, trader h is an asymptotic price-taker.
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In the subsequent examples, we show that a price vector uniformly bounded
away from zero is crucial to prove the existence of asymptotic price-takers. The
next example shows that if prices converge to zero along the sequence of commodi-
ties then a trader who consumes and infinite number of commodities can be an
asymptotic oligopolist.
Example 3. Consider an exchange economy having as set of traders I = {1, 2, 3,
. . . }. Traders 1, 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial
endowments
u1(x1) = x10 +
∞∑
j=1
1
j2
lnx1j w
1 = (1, 1, 0, . . . ),
u2(x2) = x20 + lnx
2
1 w
2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u3(x3) = x30 +
1
4
lnx32 w
3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
ut(xt) = xt0 +
1
(t− 1)2 lnx
t
t−1 w
t =
(
1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ).
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated to the exchange economy
is
(bˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . . ) =
(
1
2
,
1
8
,
1
18
, . . . ,
1
2j2
, . . .
)
,
(bˆ21, bˆ
2
2, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
1
2
, 0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆ31, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
3, . . . , bˆ
3
j , . . . ) =
(
0,
1
8
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆt1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t, bˆ
t
t+1, . . . ) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
1
2(j − 1)2 , 0, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . . At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium trader 1 is an asymptotic
oligopolist.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in a trading post for commodity j only
traders 1 and j+1 are active and they both make the same bid 1
2j2
. Therefore, the
market power of trader 1, bˆ1j/
¯ˆ
bj, is equal to
1
2
, for j ≥ 1. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/¯ˆbj =
1
2
.
The next example shows that there are exchange economies with asymptotic
price-takers even when prices converge to zero along the sequence of commodities.
In other words, a price vector uniformly bounded away from zero is a sufficient
condition for the existence of asymptotic price takers but it is not a necessary
condition.
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Example 4. Consider an exchange economy having as set of traders I = {1, 2, 3,
. . . }. Traders 1, 2, 3, and t ≥ 4 have the following utility functions and initial
endowments
u1(x1) = x10 +
∞∑
j=1
1
j2
lnx1j w
1 = (1, 1, 0, . . . ),
u2(x2) = x20 + lnx
2
1 w
2 = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
u3(x3) = x30 + lnx
3
2 w
3 = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . ),
ut(xt) = xt0 + lnx
t
t−1 w
t =
(
1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ).
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game Γ associated to the exchange economy
is
(bˆ11, bˆ
1
2, bˆ
1
3, . . . , bˆ
1
j , . . . ) =
(
1
2
,
1
6
,
1
12
, . . . ,
1
j + j2
, . . .
)
,
(bˆ21, bˆ
2
2, bˆ
2
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
1
2
, 0, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆ31, bˆ
3
2, bˆ
3
3, . . . , bˆ
2
j , . . . ) =
(
0,
1
3
, 0, . . . , 0, . . .
)
,
(bˆt1, . . . , bˆ
t
t−2, bˆ
t
t−1, bˆ
t
t, . . . ) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
1
t
, 0, . . .
)
,
for t = 4, 5, . . . . At this Cournot-Nash equilibrium trader 1 is an asymptotic
price-taker.
Proof. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in a trading post for commodity j only
traders 1 and j + 1 are active. The market power of trader 1, bˆ1j/
¯ˆ
bj, is equal to
1
1+j
, for each j ≥ 2. Hence, limj→∞ bˆ1j/¯ˆbj = 0.
The condition that the price vector is uniformly bounded away from zero and
Assumption 1 on initial endowments imply that the sums of bids and offers along
the sequence of trading posts are uniformly bounded away from zero. This can be
interpreted as a case in which all markets are “thick”. Gretsky and Ostroy (1984)
introduced the notions of “thick” and “thin” to refer to markets with many and
few traders respectively. Similarly, Shubik (1973) call them “broad” and “thin”
markets. Differently, in our framework thick means that the quantities of com-
modities and commodity money along the sequence of trading posts are uniformly
bounded away from zero. In Examples 3 and 4, the sums of bids converge to zero
along the sequence of trading posts and then markets are not thick.
Heuristically, Theorem 2, Examples 3, and Example 4 imply that if all mar-
kets are thick then all traders active on an infinite number of commodities are
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asymptotic price-takers. Differently, if markets are not thick the existence of an
asymptotic price-taker depends on the pattern of preferences among traders.
3.5 Discussion of the model
The papers of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Hart (1985), and Pascoa (1993) devel-
oped different models to study monopolistic competition in the spirit of Chamberlin
in production economies. All these contributions are characterised by firms which
have market power on some commodities and consider as given the prices of all
others. This is a crucial feature of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition and it
is similar to the mixed behaviour obtained by using the portfolio of commodities.
In the paper of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Hart (1985), the mixed behaviour
does not arise endogenously in equilibrium but it is assumed and justified by saying
that firms can ignore their impact on others because their number is very large,
i.e., firms are small compared to the whole economy. Differently, in Pascoa (1993)
the mixed behaviour arises endogenously because the set of firms is an atomless
continuum and then each firm is negligible. Unfortunately, it seems to be no hope
to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such framework and then
Pascoa (1993) proved the existence of an approximate equilibrium.
In the framework of this chapter, the mixed behaviour of an asymptotic price-
taker is characterised by an approximate competitive behaviour since traders’ mar-
ket power is never zero but it can be made arbitrary small on infinite set of com-
modities. To obtain a clear endogenous split between strategic and competitive
behaviours, it seems necessary to deal with models with a continuum of traders
and a continuum of commodities. In the literature on the core, the equivalence
and non-equivalence results were already extended to economies with a continuum
of traders and commodities by Mas-Colell (1975) and Ostroy and Zame (1994)
respectively. Nevertheless, in non-cooperative game theory many non existence re-
sults arise in games with a continuum of players and an infinite dimensional space
of strategies as shown by Kahn, Rath, and Sun (1997) and Sun and Zhang (2015).
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have extended the study of mixed behaviour to Cournotian
games by focusing on the bids side. The mixed behaviour is formalised by the
notion of asymptotic price-taker. The idea that a trader is small compared to the
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whole economy is captured by considering economies with infinitely many com-
modities and traders and by assuming that the aggregate endowment of commod-
ity money is infinite. In such framework, each trader holds only a negligible part
of the total endowment of commodity money. In Theorem 1, we have proved the
existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the all for sale model with an infinite
number of commodities and traders. The difficulties which characterise the set-
ting with a continuum of traders and strategies are overcome with our approach
based on countable infinities. In Theorem 2, we provide the sufficient conditions
on the fundamentals of an economy under which an asymptotic price-taker ex-
ists. Surprisingly, Example 3 shows that the infinities of commodities, traders,
and endowment of commodity money are not sufficient to obtain the mixed be-
haviour which characterises asymptotic price-takers but additional restrictions on
preferences are necessary.
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4Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian
4.1 Introduction
In his celebrated paper, Aumann (1964) proved that, in exchange economies
with a continuum of traders, the core coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
He also suggested
“Of course, to the extent that individual consumers or merchants
are in fact not anonymous (think of General Motors), the continuous
model is inappropriate, and our results do not apply to such a situ-
ation. But, in that case, perfect competition does not obtain either.
In many real markets the competition is indeed far from perfect; such
markets are probably best represented by a mixed model, in which some
of the traders are points in a continuum, and others are individually
significant.”
Some years later, by following Aumann’s suggestion, Gabszewicz and Mertens
(1971) and Shitovitz (1973) introduced the mixed exchange economy model, i.e.,
an exchange economy with oligopolists, represented as atoms, and small traders,
represented by an atomless continuum, in order to analyse oligopoly in a general
equilibrium framework. Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) showed that, if atoms are
not “too” big, the core still coincides with the set of Walras allocations whereas
Shitovitz (1973), in his Theorem B, proved that this result also holds if the atoms
0Some of the materials of this chapter were published in Codognato G., Ghosal S., Tonin S.
(2015), “Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian”, Journal of Economic Theory, 159, 1-14.
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are of the same type, i.e., have the same initial endowments and preferences. It is
worthy to note that Gabszewicz and Mertens were not satisfied of their result since
they find an “extravagant condition” which divides exchange economies into two
main categories: the one in which there is an equivalence result and the interesting
one.
Analogously, Okuno et al. (1980) considered the result obtained by Shitovitz
(1973) so counterintuitive to call into question the use of the core as the solu-
tion concept to study oligopoly in general equilibrium.1 This led them to replace
the core with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a model of simultaneous, non-
cooperative exchange between oligopolists and small traders as the appropriate
solution for the analysis of oligopoly in general equilibrium. The model of non-
cooperative exchange they used belongs to a line of research initiated by Shubik
(1973), Shapley (1976), and Shapley and Shubik (1977) (see Giraud (2003) for a
survey of this literature). In particular, they considered a mixed exchange econ-
omy with two commodities which are both held by all traders. Furthermore, they
assumed that no trader is allowed to be both buyer and seller of any commodity.
In this framework, they showed that, if there are two atoms of the same type who
demand, at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a positive amount of the two commodi-
ties, then the corresponding Cournot-Nash allocation is not a Walras allocation.
Therefore, under the assumptions of Shitovitz’s Theorem B, demanding a non-null
amount of the two commodities by all the atoms is a sufficient condition for a
Cournot-Nash allocation not to be a Walras allocation. This proposition allowed
Okuno et al. (1980) to conclude that the non-cooperative model they considered
is a useful one to study oligopoly in a general equilibrium framework as the small
traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while oligopolists keep their
strategic power even when their behaviour turns out to be Walrasian in the coop-
erative framework considered by Shitovitz (1973).
In this paper, we raise the question whether, in mixed exchange economies,
an equivalence, or at least a non-empty intersection, between the sets of Walras
and Cournot-Nash allocations may hold. In order to further simplify our analysis,
we consider the model of bilateral oligopoly introduced by Gabszewicz and Michel
(1997) and further analysed by Bloch and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001),
Dickson and Hartley (2008), Amir and Bloch (2009), among others. By using this
model, we still remain in a two-commodity setting but we assume that each trader
1Okuno et al. (1980) did not quote the result obtained by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971).
Nevertheless, their argument also holds, mutatis mutandis, for this result.
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holds only one of the two commodities whose aggregate amount is strictly positive
in the economy. We shall use a mixed bilateral oligopoly version of the strategic
market game with commodity money analysed by Dubey and Shubik (1978) and by
Dubey and Shapley (1994). In particular, Dubey and Shapley (1994) considered an
economy with an atomless continuum of traders and proved that in such framework
the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations coincide, thereby providing a non-
cooperative version of Aumann’s theorem. However, since in this strategic market
game trade takes place by using commodity money, liquidity problems can arise and
even if all traders are negligible there can be a non-equivalence between Cournot-
Nash and Walras allocations. For this reason, the equivalence result is obtained
under more restrictive assumptions than the ones made Aumann (1964). However,
in exchange economies with two commodities, liquidity problems do not arise and
the coincidence between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations can be
proved under more general conditions.
We first show, through some examples, that the threefold equivalence among
the sets of Walras, core, and Cournot-Nash allocations may not hold, in mixed
exchange economies with a bilateral oligopoly configuration, even under the as-
sumptions made by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973). These
examples confirm the result obtained by Okuno et al. (1980). We then answer our
main question by proving a theorem which states that demanding a null amount of
one of the two commodities by all the atoms is a necessary and sufficient condition
for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation. We also provide four
examples which show that this characterisation theorem is non-vacuous.
Our result depends only on atoms’ demand behaviour at a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. This opens the door to a research on the conditions on the fundamentals
of an economy, i.e., traders’ size, initial endowments, and preferences, under which
our theorem holds. We start an investigation in this direction by providing two
necessary conditions, expressed in terms of bounds on atoms’ marginal rates of
substitution, for our result to hold when atoms’ preferences are represented by
additively separable utility functions and by quasi linear utility functions respec-
tively. Finally, we show that, in the mixed bilateral oligopoly framework, our main
theorem can be extended to the model of non-cooperative exchange with complete
markets proposed by Amir, Sahi, Shubik, and Yao (1990).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the mathematical
model. In Section 4.3, we state the main equivalence theorems. In Section 4.4, we
provide some examples and we state and prove our main theorem. In Section 4.5,
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we show two necessary conditions on the fundamentals of an economy under which
our result holds. In Section 4.6, we extend our main result to the model analysed
by Amir et al. (1990). In Section 4.7, we draw some conclusions from our analysis.
4.2 Mathematical model
We consider an exchange economy with oligopolists, represented as atoms, and
small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of traders is denoted by
the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of traders, T is the σ-algebra of all
µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real valued, non-negative, countably additive
measure defined on T . We assume that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) < ∞. This
implies that the measure space (T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms.
Let T0 denote the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set of measure
0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the paper. Thus, a
statement asserted for “each” trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for
all such traders except possibly for a null set of traders. A coalition is a non-null
element of T . The word “integrable” is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are two different commodities. A commodity
bundle is a point in R2+. An assignment of commodity bundles to traders is an
integrable function x : T → R2+. There is a fixed initial assignment w, satisfying
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There is a coalition S such that w1(t) > 0, w2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ S, and w1(t) = 0, w2(t) > 0, for each t ∈ Sc.
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function ut : R2+ →
R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R2+ → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t ∈ T .
Let B(R2+) denote the Borel σ-algebra of R2+. Moreover, let T
⊗B denote the
σ-algebra generated by the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and F ∈ B.
Assumption 3. u : T ×R2+ → R, given by u(t, x) = ut(x), for each t ∈ T and for
each x ∈ R2+, is T
⊗B-measurable.
An allocation is an assignment x for which
∫
T
x(t) dµ =
∫
T
w(t) dµ. An al-
location y dominates an allocation x via a coalition S if ut(y(t)) ≥ ut(x(t)), for
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each t ∈ S, ut(y(t)) > ut(x(t)), for a non-null subset of traders t in S, and∫
S
y(t)dµ =
∫
S
w(t)dµ. The core is the set of all allocations which are not domi-
nated via any coalition. A Walras equilibrium is a pair (p∗,x∗), consisting of a price
vector p∗ and an allocation x∗, such that p∗x∗(t) = p∗w(t) and ut(x∗(t)) ≥ ut(y),
for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : p∗x = p∗w(t)}, for each t ∈ T .
A price vector is a non-null vector p ∈ R2+. A Walras allocation is an allocation
x∗ for which there exists a price vector p∗ such that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras
equilibrium.
We now introduce the strategic market game associated to the exchange econ-
omy. We consider a two-commodity version of the game analysed by Dubey and
Shubik (1978) and adapted for mixed exchange economies. To do so, we follow the
contribution of Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) on a strategic market game
in mixed exchange economies. Since this is a game in which trade takes place by
using commodity money, we assume, without loss of generality, that commodity 2
has this role. A strategy correspondence is a correspondence S : T → P(R2+) such
that, for each t ∈ T , S(t) = {(q, b) ∈ R2+ : q ≤ w1(t) and b ≤ w2(t)}, where q is
the amount of commodity 1 puts up in exchange for commodity money and b is
the bid of commodity money offered for commodity 1. A strategy selection is an
integrable function s : T → R+, such that s(t) ∈ S(t), for each t ∈ T . We denote
by s\s(t) the strategy selection obtained from s by replacing s(t) with s(t) ∈ S(t).
Since commodity 2 has the role of money, we normalize its price to one, i.e., p2 =
1. Therefore, given a strategy selection s, the price of commodity 1 is determined
as follows
p1 =
{
b¯
q¯
if q¯ 6= 0,
0 if q¯ = 0,
(4.1)
with q¯ =
∫
T
q(t)dµ and b¯ =
∫
T
b(t)dµ. We denote by p(s) a function which
associates with each strategy selection s the price vector (p1, 1) satisfying (4.1).
Given a strategy selection s and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows
x1(t, s(t), p) =
{
w1(t)− q(t) + b(t)p1 if p1 6= 0,
w1(t)− q(t) if p1 = 0,
x2(t, s(t), p) = w2(t)− b(t) + q(t)p1,
for each t ∈ T . Given a strategy selection s and the function p(s), the traders’
final holdings are determined according with this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t, s(t), p(s)),
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for each t ∈ T .2 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this refor-
mulation of the Dubey and Shubik model.
Definition 1. A strategy selection sˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ))) ≥ ut(x(t, sˆ \ s(t), p(sˆ \ s(t)))),
for each s(t) ∈ S(t) and for each t ∈ T .
It is straightforward to verify that a strategy selection s such that (q(t),b(t)) =
(0, 0) for each t ∈ T is always a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We call it trivial
Cournot-Nash equilibrium since there is no trade. Differently, if a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium sˆ is such that ¯ˆq > 0 and
¯ˆ
b > 0, we say that sˆ is an active Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. Since we want to establish equivalence results, in the rest of the
paper the trivial Cournot-Nash equilibrium is systematically ignored and we refer
to active Cournot-Nash equilibria simply as Cournot-Nash equilibria.
A Cournot-Nash allocation is an allocation xˆ such that xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)),
for each t ∈ T , where sˆ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
4.3 Theorems of equivalence
In this section, we first state the equivalence result between the core and the
set of Walras allocations established by Aumann (1964) in atomless economies and
we prove the analogous theorem between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras
allocations. We then recall the equivalence results between the core and the set
of Walras allocations obtained by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz
(1973) in mixed exchange economies.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if T = T0, then the core coincides
with the set of Walras allocations.
Proof. See the proof of the main theorem in Aumann (1964).
The equivalence theorem between Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations could
not be established in such generality because it holds only for active Cournot-Nash
equilibria. Indeed, when the Walras allocation is interior for a non-null subset of
2In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t) and
the function x(t, s(t), p(s)).
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traders, there exists an allocation associated to the trivial Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium which breaks the equivalence result. But by excluding the trivial Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, we do not have an equivalence when a Walras allocation is equal
to the initial assignments.
Theorem 2. Let x be an allocation such that x(t)  0 for a non-null subset of
traders t ∈ T . Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if T = T0, the allocation x is a
Cournot-Nash allocation if and only if it is a Walras allocation.
Proof. Let x be a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there exists a strategy selection
sˆ, which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, such that x(t) = xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)),
for each t ∈ T . We now show that xˆ is also a Walras allocation. Let pˆ = p(sˆ).
Since xˆ(t)  0 for a non-null subset of traders t ∈ T , pˆ  0. We have that
pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t), for each t ∈ T , since pˆ2 = 1 and
pˆ1xˆ1(t) + pˆ2xˆ2(t) = pˆ1
(
w1(t)− qˆ(t) + bˆ(t)
pˆ1
)
+
pˆ2
(
w2(t)− bˆ(t) + qˆ(t)pˆ1
)
= pˆ1w1(t) + pˆ2w2(t),
(4.2)
for each t ∈ T . Suppose that there exist a trader t ∈ T and a commodity bundle
x˜ such that ut(x˜) > ut(xˆ(t)) and x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}. Since the utility
function is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2, x˜1 > xˆ1(t) or x˜2 > xˆ2(t). First,
assume that the trader t is such that w1(t) > 0 and w2(t) = 0. Consider the case
where x˜1 > xˆ1(t). If sˆ(t) is such that qˆ(t) = 0 then pˆx˜ 6= pˆw(t), a contradiction.
If sˆ(t) is such that qˆ(t) > 0, then there exists a strategy s˜(t) ∈ S(t) such that
x˜ = x(t, sˆ \ s˜(t), p(sˆ)). Note that p(sˆ) = p(sˆ \ s˜(t)) as pˆ1 =
∫
T bˆ(t)dµ∫
T qˆ(t)dµ
and pˆ2 = 1.
But then,
ut(x(t, sˆ \ s˜(t), p(sˆ))) > ut(x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ))),
a contradiction. Consider the case where x˜2 > xˆ2(t). If sˆ(t) is such that qˆ(t) =
w2(t), then pˆx˜ 6= pˆw(t), a contradiction. If sˆ(t) is such that qˆ(t) < w2(t), then
there exists a strategy s˜(t) ∈ S(t) such that x˜ = x(t, sˆ \ s˜(t), p(sˆ)). But then,
ut(x(t, sˆ \ s˜(t), p(sˆ))) > ut(x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ))),
a contradiction. Now, assume that the trader t is such that w1(t) = 0 and
w2(t) > 0. Then, the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the same kinds
of contradictions. Therefore, (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium. Now, let x be a Walras
allocation. Then, there exist a price p∗ and an assignment x∗ = x such that the pair
(p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilibrium. We now show that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash allo-
cation. It is straightforward to verify that in two-commodity exchange economies
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there exists always a strategy selection s∗ such that x∗(t) = x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗)), for
each t ∈ T . Since utility functions are strongly monotone, by Assumption 2,
p∗  0. Since, given a trader t ∈ T , p(s∗)x∗(t) = p(s∗)w(t) by equation (4.2)
and p∗ is the unique price vector such that p∗x∗(t) = p∗w(t), p∗ = p(s∗). Suppose
that s∗ is not a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, there exist a trader t ∈ T and a
strategy s˜ ∈ S(t) such that
ut(x(t, s∗ \ s˜(t), p(s∗))) > ut(x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗))).
Note that p(s∗) = p(s∗ \ s˜(t)) as p∗1 =
∫
T b
∗(t)dµ∫
T q
∗(t)dµ . But then, there exists x˜ =
x(t, s∗ \ s˜(t), p(s∗)) such that ut(x˜) > ut(x∗(t)) and p∗x˜ = p∗w(t), by equation
(4.2), a contradiction. Therefore, s∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973) showed that an equiva-
lence between the core and the set of Walras allocations may hold even when the
space of traders contains atoms. In order to state their two main theorems, we need
to introduce some further notation and definitions. Two traders τ, ρ ∈ T are said
to be of the same type if w(τ) = w(ρ) and uτ = uρ. Let A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak, . . .}
be a partition of the set of atoms T \T0 such that Ak contains all the atoms who are
of the same type as an atom τk ∈ Ak, for each k = 1, . . . , |A|, where |A| denotes the
cardinality of the partition A. Moreover, let Tk be the set of the traders t ∈ T who
are of the same type as the atoms in Ak, for each k = 1, . . . , |A|. Given a set Tk,
denote by τhk the h-th atom belonging to the set Tk, for each h = 1, . . . , |Ak|, where
|Ak| denotes the cardinality of the set Ak. We can now state the two theorems.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if, either |A| = 1 and∑|A1|h=1 µ(τh1)µ(T1) < 1,
or, |A| > 1 and∑|A|k=1∑|Ak|h=1 µ(τhk)µ(Tk) ≤ 1, then the core coincides with the set of Walras
allocations.
Proof. See the proof of the theorem in Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971).
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if |A| = 1 and |A1| ≥ 2, then the
core coincides with the set of Walras allocations.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem B in Shitovitz (1973).
Okuno et al. (1980) already showed that the equivalence stated by Theorem 4
(Shitovitz’s Theorem B) does not extend to the set of Cournot-Nash allocations.
In the next section, we further investigate the relation between the core and the
sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations.
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4.4 Some examples and two theorems
In this section, we provide some examples to extend Okuno et alii’s results to
mixed exchange economies with corner endowments. We then show some examples
in which the set of Cournot-Nash allocations coincides with the Walras allocations
which, it turn, coincides with the core. Moreover, we answer our main question
by providing two theorems. The first theorem shows sufficient conditions under
which the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations are not equivalent. The
second theorem establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot-Nash
allocation to be a Walras allocation.
We start our analysis by considering Example 1 in Shitovitz (1973) where the
market of commodity 2 is monopolistic. The example shows that Theorems 3 and
4 cannot be extended to this case as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) = 1. Moreover,
in this market configuration, the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations
are disjoint as there is no Cournot-Nash equilibrium (there exists only the trivial
Cournot-Nash equilibrium).
Example 1. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1+
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0, w(2) = (0, 4),
u2(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is an allocation in the core, which is not a Walras
allocation, and there is no Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (1, 1),
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (2, 2). As shown by Shi-
tovitz (1973), the allocation x˜ such that (x˜1(t), x˜2(t)) = (1, 1), for each t ∈ T0,
(x˜1(2), x˜2(2)) = (3, 3) is in the core but it is not a Walras allocation. Suppose that
there is a Cournot-Nash allocation xˆ. Then, there is a strategy selection sˆ which is
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such that xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each
t ∈ T . In particular, x(2, sˆ(2), p(sˆ)) = (¯ˆq, 4 − bˆ(2)). Let s′(2) be a strategy such
that 0 < b′(2) < bˆ(2). Then,
u2(x(2, sˆ \ s′(2), p(sˆ \ s′(2)))) > u2(x(2, sˆ(2), p(sˆ))),
as x(2, sˆ \ s′(2), p(sˆ \ s′(2))) = (¯ˆq, 4− b′(2)) and u2 is strongly monotone, a contra-
diction. Then, there is no Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as in Ex-
ample 1 but a competitive fringe competes with the monopolist in the market
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for commodity 2. The core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as the
assumptions of Theorem 3 are satisfied but no Cournot-Nash allocation is in the
core.
Example 2. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 2], A1 = {3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1, 2], w(3) = (0, 4), u3(x) = √x1 +√x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
2, 1),
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (4
√
2−4, 8√2−8), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (4−2
√
2, 8−
4
√
2), for each t ∈ [1, 2], (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = (4 − 2
√
2, 8 − 4√2). Then, by Theorem
3, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1,
|A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then,
there is a strategy selection s∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is
such that x∗(t) = x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗)), for each t ∈ T . But then, s∗ must be such that
q∗(t) = 8 − 4√2, for each t ∈ [0, 1], b∗(t) = 4√2 − 4, for each t ∈ [1, 2], b∗(3) =
4
√
2− 4. However, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection
sˆ where (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (2.221, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 1.779), for
each t ∈ [1, 2], (qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 0.993).3 It is straightforward to see that s∗ 6= sˆ.
Then, the unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
In the following example, all traders have the same utility function as in Exam-
ple 1 but there are two oligopolists of the same type in the market for commodity
2. The core coincides with the set of Walras allocations as the assumptions of
Theorem 4 are satisfied but no Cournot-Nash allocation is in the core.
Example 3. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation.
3These results are obtained with Mathematica. Since the exact strategies are complicate
formulas, we have written the approximate ones. The actions qˆ(t), for each t ∈ [0, 1], bˆ(t),
for each t ∈ [1, 2], and bˆ(3) are the roots of the following polynomials x6 − 64 + x5 + 640x4 −
3200x3 + 8960x2 − 13312x + 8192, x6 + 40x5 − 400x4 + 1920x3 − 5120x2 + 7168x − 4096, and
x6 + 20x5 + 160x4 + 640x3 + 1280x2 + 2048x− 4096 respectively.
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Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
2, 1),
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (4
√
2−4, 8√2−8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
(4 − 2√2, 8 − 4√2). Then, by Theorem 4, the unique Walras allocation is also
the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Suppose that x∗ is
also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection s∗ which is
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗)), for
each t ∈ T . But then, s∗ must be such that q∗(t) = 8 − 4√2, for each t ∈ [0, 1],
b∗(2) = b∗(3) = 4
√
2 − 4. However, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the
strategy selection sˆ where (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (1.903, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(2), bˆ(2)) =
(qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 0.864).4 It is straightforward to see that s∗ 6= sˆ. Then, the unique
Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
In Examples 2 and 3, there are atoms who demand a strictly positive amount
of both commodities at a Walras equilibrium and the sets of Walras and Cournot-
Nash allocations are disjoint. The following theorem generalises these examples
providing a sufficient condition for a Walras allocation not to be a Cournot-Nash
allocation. In order to state the theorem, we need a further assumption on traders’
utility functions.
Assumption 4. ut : R2+ → R is differentiable, for each t ∈ T \ T0.5
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, if the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras
equilibrium such that x∗(τ) 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \T0, then x∗ is not a Cournot-
Nash allocation.
Proof. Assume that the pair (p∗,x∗) is a Walras equilibrium such that x∗(τ) 0,
for an atom τ ∈ T \ T0. Moreover, suppose that x∗ is a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Then, there is a strategy selection s∗ such that x∗(t) = x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗)), for each
t ∈ T , where s∗ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since, given a trader t ∈ T ,
p(s∗)x∗(t) = p(s∗)w(t) and p∗ is the unique price vector such that p∗x∗(t) = p∗w(t),
p∗ = p(s∗). First, consider an atom τ ∈ T \T0 such that w1(τ) > 0 and w2(τ) = 0.
At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for the atom τ , the marginal rate of substitution
must be equal to the marginal rate at which he can trade off commodity 1 for
commodity 2 (see Okuno et al. (1980)). Moreover, at a Walras equilibrium, the
4The actions qˆ(t), for each t ∈ [0, 1], and bˆ(2) = bˆ(3) are the roots of the following polyno-
mials 3x3 − 4x2 + 64x− 128 and 6x3 + 7x2 + 8x− 16 respectively.
5In this assumption, differentiability should be implicitly understood to include the case of
infinite partial derivatives along the boundary of the consumption set (for a discussion of this
case, see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 58).
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marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the relative price of commodity 1
in terms of commodity 2, where p∗2 = 1. These conditions are expressed by the
following equations
dx2
dx1
= −p∗1
q¯∗ − q∗(τ)µ(τ)
q¯∗
= −p∗1.
Then, we must have q∗(τ) = 0. But then, (x∗1(τ),x
∗
2(τ)) = (w1(τ), 0), a contradic-
tion. Hence, x∗ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation. Now, consider an atom τ ∈ T \T0
and assume that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0. At a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for
the atom τ , the marginal rate of substitution must be equal to the marginal rate
at which he can trade off commodity 1 for commodity 2 (see Okuno et al. (1980)).
Moreover, at a Walras equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution must be equal
to the relative price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, where p∗2 = 1. These
two conditions are expressed by the following equations
dx2
dx1
= −p∗1
b¯
∗
b¯
∗ − b∗(τ)µ(τ) = −p
∗
1.
Then, we must have b∗(τ) = 0. But then, (x∗1(τ),x
∗
2(τ)) = (0,w2(τ)), a contradic-
tion. Hence, x∗ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 2 only in that the monopolist and
the competitive fringe have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows that, under
the assumptions of Theorem 3, the converse of Theorem 5 does not hold. At
the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and the competitive fringe
demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is also
the unique allocation in the core but it is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 4. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 2], A1 = {3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
1
10
x2, for each t ∈ [1, 2], w(3) = (0, 4), u3(x) = √x1 + 110x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
but which is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
3 +
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (8− 4
√
3, 8), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2
√
3− 2, 0),
for each t ∈ [1, 2], (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = (2
√
3− 2, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique
Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1,
and µ(τ11)
µ(T1)
< 1. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-Nash allocation. Then, there
is a strategy selection s∗ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and which is such
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that x∗(t) = x(t, s∗(t), p(s∗)), for each t ∈ T . But then, s∗ must be such that
q∗(t) = 2
√
21 − 6, for each t ∈ [0, 1], b∗(t) = 4, for each t ∈ [1, 2], b∗(3) = 4.
However, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection sˆ where
(qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (2.857, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 4), for each t ∈ [1, 2],
(qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 3.140).6 It is straightforward to see that s∗ 6= sˆ. Then, the
unique Walras allocation is not a Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 3 only in that the two oligopolists
have quasi-linear utility functions. It shows that, under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 4, the converse of Theorem 5 does not hold. At the unique Walras equilibrium,
the two oligopolists demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique Walras
allocation is also the unique allocation in the core but it is not a Cournot-Nash
allocation.
Example 5. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 +
1
10
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation but which is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
3 +
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (8−4
√
3, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
(2
√
3− 2, 0). Then, by Theorem 4, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique
allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. Suppose that x∗ is also a Cournot-
Nash allocation. Then, there is a strategy selection s∗ which is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium and which is such that x∗(t) = x(t,b∗(t), p(b∗)), for each t ∈ T . But
then, s∗ must be such that q∗(t) = 2
√
21 − 6, for each t ∈ T0, b∗(2) = b∗(3) = 4.
However, the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection sˆ where
(qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (2.857, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(2), bˆ(2)) = (qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 3.140).7
It is straightforward to see that s∗ 6= sˆ. Then, the unique Walras allocation is not
a Cournot-Nash allocation.
We now address the question whether, in mixed exchange economies, an equiva-
lence, or at least a non-empty intersection, between the sets of Walras and Cournot-
6The actions qˆ(t), for each t ∈ [0, 1], and bˆ(3) are the roots of the following polynomials
x7 +4x6−16x5−400x4 +6400x3−38400x2 +102400x−102400 and x7 +20x6 +160x5 +1040x4 +
6080x3 + 20224x2 + 25600x− 640000.
7The actions qˆ(t), for each t ∈ [0, 1], and bˆ(2) = bˆ(3) are the roots of the following polyno-
mials 2x3 − 25x2 + 200x− 400 and 8x3 + 50x2 − 625.
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Nash allocations may hold. The following example differs from Example 4 only for
the lower “weight” of commodity 2 for traders who have quasi-linear utility func-
tions. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and the competitive
fringe demand a null amount of commodity 2 and this unique Walras allocation is
also the unique allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 6. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 2], A1 = {3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
1
30
x2, for each t ∈ [1, 2], w(3) = (0, 4), u3(x) = √x1 + 130x2. Then,
there is a unique allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation
and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
3 +
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (8− 4
√
3, 8), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2
√
3− 2, 0),
for each t ∈ [1, 2], (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) = (2
√
3− 2, 0). Then, by Theorem 3, the unique
Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1, |A1| = 1, and
µ(τ11)
µ(T1)
< 1. The unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection sˆ where
(qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (4
√
3−4, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 4), for each t ∈ [1, 2],
(qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 4). But then, x∗(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Hence, the
unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
The following example differs from Example 5 only for the lower “weight” of
commodity 2 for traders who have quasi-linear utility functions. At the unique
Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists demand a null amount of commodity 2
and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core and the
unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 7. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 1], A1 = {2, 3}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(2) = µ(3) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ T0,
w(2) = w(3) = (0, 4), u2(x) = u3(x) =
√
x1 +
1
30
x2. Then, there is a unique
allocation in the core which is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique
Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (
√
3 +
1, 1), (x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (8−4
√
3, 8), for each t ∈ T0, (x∗1(2),x∗2(2)) = (x∗1(3),x∗2(3)) =
(2
√
3− 2, 0). Then, by Theorem 4, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique
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allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. The unique Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium is the strategy selection sˆ where (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (4
√
3−4, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1],
and (qˆ(2), bˆ(2)) = (qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) = (0, 4). But then, x∗(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for
each t ∈ T . Hence, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash
allocation.
Examples 6 and 7 differ from Examples 4 and 5 as, in the latter, all atoms
who hold commodity 2 demand a null amount of this commodity at a Walras
equilibrium but not at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium whereas, in the former, they
also demand a null amount of commodity 2 at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The
following theorem generalises Examples 6 and 7 as it shows that demanding a null
amount of one of the two commodities by all the atoms is a necessary and sufficient
condition for a Cournot-Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation.
Theorem 6. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and let pˆ = p(sˆ) and xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then, the
pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for each
t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for
each t ∈ T , and pˆ = p(sˆ). Suppose that the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium.
Moreover, suppose that xˆ(τ) 0, for an atom τ ∈ T \T0. Then, xˆ is not a Cournot-
Nash allocation, by Theorem 5, a contradiction. Hence, xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for
each t ∈ T \T0. Conversely, suppose that xˆ1(t) = 0 or xˆ2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \T0.
Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0. First, assume that w1(τ) = 0 and w2(τ) > 0.
Consider the case where xˆ1(τ) = 0. Then, bˆ(τ) = 0 and xˆ(τ) = (0,w2(τ)). We
have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ10 + pˆ2(w2(τ)− 0) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that u
τ (x1, x2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤
w2(τ)
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
¯ˆ
b− bˆ(τ)µ(τ)
¯ˆ
b
1
pˆ1
− ∂u
τ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
as bˆ(τ) = 0. Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
1
pˆ1
− ∂u
τ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ 0
as
¯ˆ
b−0
¯ˆ
b
= 1. But then, dxˆ2(0)
dx1
≥ −pˆ1. Consider the case where dxˆ2(0)dx1 = −pˆ1. Then,
uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y), for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}, as uτ is quasi-concave, by
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Assumption 2. Consider now the case where dxˆ2(0)
dx1
> −pˆ1. Then, dxˆ2(x1)dx1 > −pˆ1, for
each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ)pˆ1 , as uτ is quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. Suppose that there
exists a commodity bundle x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)).
Then, x˜2 > xˆ2(x˜1) as u
τ is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. But then, by the
Mean Value Theorem, there exists some x¯1 such that 0 < x¯1 < x˜1 and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(0)− xˆ2(x˜1)
0− x˜1 < −pˆ1,
a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y) for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}.
Consider now the case where xˆ2(τ) = 0. Then, bˆ(τ) = w2(τ) and xˆ(τ) = (
w2(τ)
pˆ1
, 0).
We have that pˆxˆ(τ) = pˆw(τ) since
pˆ1xˆ1(τ) + pˆ2xˆ2(τ) = pˆ1
w2(τ)
pˆ1
+ pˆ2(w2(τ)−w2(τ)) = pˆ2w2(τ).
Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that u
τ (x1, xˆ2(x1)) ≡ uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤
w2(τ)
pˆ1
. We have that
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
¯ˆ
b− bˆ(τ)µ(τ)
¯ˆ
b
1
pˆ1
− ∂u
τ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ 0
as bˆ(τ) = w2(τ). Then,
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
1
pˆ1
− ∂u
τ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
> 0
as
¯ˆ
b−w2(τ)µ(τ)
¯ˆ
b
< 1. But then, dxˆ2(x1)
dx1
< −pˆ1, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ)pˆ1 , as uτ is
quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. Suppose that there exists a commodity bundle
x˜ ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)} such that uτ (x˜) > uτ (xˆ(τ)). Then, x˜2 > xˆ2(x˜1) as uτ
is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. But then, by the Mean Value Theorem,
there exists some x¯1 such that x˜1 < x¯1 <
w2(τ)
pˆ1
and such that
dxˆ2(x¯1)
dx1
=
xˆ2(x˜1)− xˆ2(w2(τ)pˆ1 )
x˜1 − w2(τ)pˆ1
> −pˆ1,
a contradiction. Therefore, uτ (xˆ(τ)) ≥ uτ (y), for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(τ)}.
Now, assume that w1(τ) > 0 and w2(τ) = 0. Then, the previous argument leads,
mutatis mutandis, to the same kind of contradictions. We then conclude that
pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y) for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for each
t ∈ T \ T0. Finally, it is straightforward to show (see the proof of Theorem 2) that
pˆxˆ(t) = pˆw(t) and ut(xˆ(t)) ≥ ut(y), for each y ∈ {x ∈ R2+ : pˆx = pˆw(t)}, for each
t ∈ T0. Hence, the pair (pˆ, xˆ) is a Walras equilibrium.
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Examples 6 and 7 show that Theorem 6 is non-vacuous when atoms demand,
at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the commodity they hold. The
following two examples show that it is also non-vacuous when atoms demand, at
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, a null amount of the commodity they do not hold.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 6 for a
further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the same type
as the monopolist. At the unique Walras equilibrium, both the monopolist and
the competitive fringe with traders of the same type as the monopolist demand a
null amount of commodity 1 and this unique Walras allocation is also the unique
allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 8. Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satisfy-
ing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 3], A1 = {4}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue mea-
sure, µ(4) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1], w(t) = (0, 4),
ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1, 2], w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) = 14x1 +
√
x2, for each
t ∈ [2, 3], w(4) = (0, 4), u4(x) = 1
4
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique allocation in
the core which is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash
allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (1, 1),
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [1, 2],
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (0, 4), for each t ∈ [2, 3], (x∗1(4),x∗2(4)) = (0, 4). Then, by Theorem
3, the unique Walras allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1,
|A1| = 1, and µ(τ11)µ(T1) < 1. The unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy
selection sˆ where (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (2, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 2), for
each t ∈ [1, 2], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 0), for each t ∈ [2, 3], and (qˆ(4), bˆ(4)) = (0, 0). But
then x∗(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Hence, the unique Walras allocation
is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
The structure of the following example differs from that of Example 7 for a
further competitive fringe which holds commodity 2 and is not of the same type
as the two oligopolists. At the unique Walras equilibrium, the two oligopolists
demand a null amount of commodity 1 and this unique Walras allocation is also
the unique allocation in the core and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Example 9. . Consider the following specification of the exchange economy satis-
fying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. T0 = [0, 2], A1 = {3, 4}, T0 is taken with Lebesgue
measure, µ(3) = µ(4) = 1, w(t) = (4, 0), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [0, 1],
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w(t) = (0, 4), ut(x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2, for each t ∈ [1, 2], w(3) = w(4) = (0, 4),
u3(x) = u4(x) = 1
4
x1 +
√
x2. Then, there is a unique allocation in the core which
is also the unique Walras allocation and the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
Proof. The unique Walras equilibrium is the pair (p∗,x∗), where (p∗1, p
∗
2) = (1, 1),
(x∗1(t),x
∗
2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (x∗1(t),x∗2(t)) = (2, 2), for each t ∈ [1, 2],
(x∗1(3),x
∗
2(3)) = (x
∗
1(4),x
∗
2(4)) = (0, 4). Then, by Theorem 4, the unique Walras
allocation is also the unique allocation in the core as |A| = 1 and |A1| = 2. The
unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the strategy selection sˆ where (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) =
(2, 0), for each t ∈ [0, 1], (qˆ(t), bˆ(t)) = (0, 2), for each t ∈ [1, 2], (qˆ(3), bˆ(3)) =
(qˆ(4), bˆ(4)) = (0, 0). But then x∗(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Hence, the
unique Walras allocation is also the unique Cournot-Nash allocation.
4.5 Necessary conditions for an equivalence
In all the examples of the previous section, preferences are represented by
additively separable utility functions, i.e., utility functions of the form u(x) =
v1(x1) + v2(x2), for each x ∈ R2+. In this section, we first provide a necessary
condition for Theorem 6 to hold when atoms’ preferences are of this kind.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then, for each t ∈ T \ T0
such that ut(x) = vt1(x1) + v
t
2(x2), xˆ1(t) = 0 only if −∂u
t(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂u
t(0,x2)
∂x2
> −∞, for
each x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(x1,0)∂x1 /
∂ut(x1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for
each t ∈ T . Moreover, let pˆ = p(sˆ). Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0 such that
uτ (x) = vτ1 (x1) + v
τ
2 (x2). Suppose that xˆ1(τ) = 0. By the same argument used in
the proof of Theorem 6, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≥ −pˆ1.
Then,
−
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x2
> −∞.
But then, ∂u
τ (0,xˆ2(τ))
∂x1
=
∂vτ1 (0)
∂x1
= ∂u
τ (0,x2)
∂x1
< +∞, for each x2 ∈ R+. Moreover,
∂uτ (0,x2)
∂x2
> 0, for each x2 ∈ R+, as uτ is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2.
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Therefore, −∂uτ (0,x2)
∂x1
/∂u
τ (0,x2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each x2 ∈ R+. Suppose that xˆ2(τ) = 0.
By the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 6, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
< −pˆ1.
Then,
−
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x2
< 0.
But then, ∂u
τ (xˆ1(τ),0)
∂x2
=
∂vτ2 (0)
∂x2
= ∂u
τ (x1,0)
∂x2
< +∞, for each x1 ∈ R+. Moreover,∂uτ (x1,0)∂x1
> 0, for each x1 ∈ R+, as uτ is strongly monotone, by Assumption 2. Therefore,
−∂uτ (x1,0)
∂x1
/∂u
τ (x1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+. Hence, for each t ∈ T \ T0 such that
ut(x) = vt1(x1) + v
t
2(x2), xˆ1(t) = 0 only if −∂u
t(0,x2)
∂x1
/∂u
t(0,x2)
∂x2
> −∞, for each
x2 ∈ R+, and xˆ2(t) = 0 only if −∂ut(x1,0)∂x1 /
∂ut(x1,0)
∂x2
< 0, for each x1 ∈ R+.
In Examples 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, atoms’ preferences are represented by quasi-
linear utility functions in commodity 2, i.e., utility functions of the form u(x) =
v(x1)+k x2, for each x ∈ R2+. We finally provide a necessary condition for Theorem
6 to hold when atoms’ preferences are of this kind and atoms’ initial endowment
are such that w1(t) = 0 and w2(t) > 0.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Then, for each t ∈ T \ T0
such that ut(x) = vt(x1) + k x2, w1(t) = 0, and w2(t) > 0, xˆ2(t) = 0 only if
−∂ut(x1,0)
∂x1
/∂u
t(x1,0)
∂x2
< −w2(t)
w¯1
, for each x1 ∈ R+, with w¯1 =
∫
T
w1(t)dµ.
Proof. Let sˆ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and let xˆ(t) = x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for
each t ∈ T . Moreover, let pˆ = p(sˆ). Consider an atom τ ∈ T \ T0 such that
uτ (x) = vτ (x1) + k x2, w1(τ) = 0, and w2(τ) > 0. Suppose xˆ2(τ) = 0. Then
bˆ(τ) = w2(τ) and xˆ(τ) = (
w2(τ)
p1
, 0). By the same argument used in the proof of
Theorem 6, it follows that
−
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x1
∂uτ (xˆ(τ))
∂x2
≤ −pˆ1.
Since pˆ1 =
b¯
q¯
, pˆ1 ≥ w2(τ)w¯1 . Let xˆ2(x1) be a function such that uτ (x1, x2(x1)) ≡
uτ (xˆ(τ)), for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ)pˆ1 . Then,
dxˆ2(x1)
dx1
< −w2(τ)
w¯1
, for each 0 ≤ x1 ≤ w2(τ)pˆ1 ,
as uτ is quasi-concave, by Assumption 2. But then
−
∂uτ (x1,0)
∂x1
∂uτ (x1,0)
∂x2
< −w2(τ)
w¯1
,
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for each x1 ∈ R+, as uτ is quasi-linear in x2. Hence, for each t ∈ T \ T0 such
that ut(x) = vt1(x1) + k x2, xˆ2(t) = 0 only if −∂u
t(x1,0)
∂x1
/∂u
t(x1,0)
∂x2
< −w2(t)
w¯1
, for each
x1 ∈ R+.
4.6 Discussion of the model
Here, we address the question whether, in the mixed bilateral oligopoly frame-
work considered so far, the result of Theorem 6 also holds for the model of non-
cooperative exchange considered by Amir et al. (1990). Dubey and Shubik (1978)
distinguished between commodity money and all other commodities. Then, there
is one market (trading post) for each commodity where commodity money can be
exchanged directly for one of the other commodities. The direct exchange between
any other two commodities is ruled out. Differently Amir et al. (1990) (Model 2
hereafter) analysed a model where markets are complete, i.e., all commodities can
be used for trade. In this model, there is a market for each pair of commodities
with the price in a market being the ratio of the total amount of bids in each of
the two commodities which are exchanged in that market.
In general, with more than two commodities, the sets of Cournot-Nash alloca-
tions of the two models differ as, in Model 1, only commodity money can be used
for trade whereas, in Model 2, all commodities can be used for trade. Furthermore,
since in this model prices are determined for each pairs of commodities, they are
not necessarily consistent through pairs of markets in which the same commodity
is exchanged.
We now introduce Model 2. A strategy correspondence is a correspondence
B : T → P(R4+) such that, for each t ∈ T , B(t) = {b ∈ R4+ :
∑2
j=1 bij ≤
wi(t), i = 1, 2}, where bij represents the amount of commodity i that trader t
offers in exchange for commodity j. A strategy selection is an integrable function
b : T → R4+, such that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given a strategy selection b,
we define the aggregate matrix B¯ = (
∫
T
bij(t)dµ). Moreover, we denote by b \ b(t)
the strategy selection obtained from b by replacing b(t) with b(t) ∈ B(t).8
Given a strategy selection b, the 2× 2 matrix P is said to be the price matrix
generated by b if
pij =
{
b¯ij
b¯ji
if b¯ji 6= 0,
0 if b¯ji = 0,
8In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by b(t) both a strategy selection of
a trader t in Model 2 and an action of a trader t in Model 1. The context should clarify whether
b(t) is a trader’s strategy selection or a trader’s action.
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with i, j = 1, 2. We denote by P (b) a function which associates with each strategy
selection b the price matrix P generated by b. Given a strategy selection b and a
price matrix P , consider the assignment determined as follows
xj(t,b(t), p) = wj(t)−
2∑
i=1
bji(t) +
2∑
i=1
bij(t)pij,
for j = 1, 2, for each t ∈ T . Given a strategy selection b and the function P (b), the
traders’ final holdings are determined according with this rule and consequently
expressed by the assignment
x(t) = x(t,b(t), P (b)),
for each t ∈ T .9 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an allocation.
We are now able to define a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for Model 2.
Definition 2. A strategy selection b˜ such that ¯˜b12 > 0 and
¯˜b21 > 0 is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜))) ≥ ut(x(t, b˜ \ b(t), P (b˜ \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T .10
A Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2 is an allocation x˜ such that x˜(t) =
x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜)), for each t ∈ T , where b˜ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model
2.
The following theorem shows an equivalence between the sets of Cournot-Nash
allocations of Model 1 and Model 2.
Theorem 7. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the sets of Cournot-Nash allocations
of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
Proof. Let xˆ be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1. Then, there is a strategy
selection sˆ which is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 1 and is such that xˆ(t) =
x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ)), for each t ∈ T . Consider the strategy selection bˆ of Model 2 such
that bˆ11(t) = bˆ22(t) = 0, bˆ12(t) = qˆ(t), and bˆ21(t) = bˆ(t). It is straightforward
to show that p12 =
1
p1
and p21 = p1. Then xˆ(t) = x(t, bˆ(t), P (bˆ)), for each t ∈ T .
9In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t) and
the function x(t,b(t), P (b)).
10Note that this definition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium refers only to equilibria at which
the markets for commodities 1 and 2 are active.
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Suppose that xˆ is not a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2. Then, there exist a
trader t ∈ T and a strategy b(t) ∈ B(t) such that
ut(x(t, bˆ \ b(t), P (bˆ \ b(t)))) > ut(x(t, bˆ(t), P (bˆ))).
Consider a strategy s(t) such that q(t) = b12(t) and b(t) = b21(t). Let p2 = 1
and it is straightforward to show that p1 = p21. Then, x(t, sˆ \ s(t), p(sˆ \ s(t))) =
x(t, bˆ \ b(t), P (bˆ \ b(t))). But then,
ut(x(t, sˆ \ s(t), p(sˆ \ s(t)))) > ut(x(t, sˆ(t), p(sˆ))),
a contradiction. Therefore, xˆ is a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2. Let x˜
be a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 2. Suppose that x˜ is not a Cournot-Nash
allocation of Model 1. Then, the previous argument leads, mutatis mutandis, to the
same kind of contradictions. Therefore, x˜ is a Cournot-Nash allocation of Model 1.
Hence, the sets of Cournot-Nash allocations of Model 1 and Model 2 coincide.
The following corollary shows that Theorem 6 holds, mutatis mutandis, for
Model 2.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of Model 2 and let p˜ = (
¯˜
b21
¯˜
b12
, 1) and x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜)), for each t ∈ T .
Then, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a Walras equilibrium if and only if x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0,
for each t ∈ T \ T0.
Proof. Let b˜ be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Model 2 and let p˜ = (
¯˜
b21
¯˜
b12
, 1) and
x˜(t) = x(t, b˜(t), P (b˜)), for each t ∈ T . By Theorem 7, there exists a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of Model 1, s˜, such that q˜(t) = b˜12(t) and b˜(t) = b˜21(t), for each
t ∈ T , for which x˜(t) = x(t, s˜(t), p(s˜)) and p˜ = p(s˜) = ( ¯˜b21¯˜
b12
, 1). Then, x˜(t) is a
Cournot-Nash allocation for Model 1. Hence, by Theorem 6, the pair (p˜, x˜) is a
Walras equilibrium if and only if x˜1(t) = 0 or x˜2(t) = 0, for each t ∈ T \ T0.
4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reconsidered, in the framework of bilateral oligopoly,
the problem raised by Okuno et al. (1980) about the non-cooperative foundation
of oligopolistic behaviour in general equilibrium. We can now summarize the im-
plications of the previous analysis. The condition which requires that the atoms
are not “too” big, introduced by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971), is not necessary
for the equivalence between the core and the set of Walras allocations, as shown
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by Theorem 4, but it is sufficient for this equivalence, by Theorem 3; moreover,
it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a non-empty intersection between the sets
of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations as shown, respectively, by Examples 7
and 4. The condition which requires that there are only atoms of the same type,
introduced by Shitovitz (1973), is not necessary for the equivalence between the
core and the set of Walras allocations, as shown by Theorem 3, but it is sufficient
for this equivalence, by Theorem 4; moreover, it is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a non-empty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allo-
cations as shown, respectively, by Examples 6 and 5. Theorem 6 states that the
condition which characterises the non-empty intersection of the sets of Walras and
Cournot-Nash allocations requires that each atom demands a null amount of one
commodity. Moreover, Examples 6, 7, 8, and 9 show that this characterisation
condition is non-vacuous. Propositions 1 and 2 provide a rationale for these exam-
ples by exhibiting necessary conditions, expressed in terms of bounds on atoms’
marginal rates of substitution, for Theorem 6 to hold when atoms’ preferences are
represented by additively separable utility functions and quasi-linear utility func-
tion respectively. We leave as an open problem for further research the generali-
sation of this proposition, namely, the determination of more general assumptions
on traders’ size, endowments, and preferences under which our characterisation
condition holds. This analysis could help to understand more deeply which are
the differences between atoms’ Walrasian behaviour in a cooperative and in a non-
cooperative framework. We have also proved that Theorem 6 can be extended, in
bilateral oligopoly, to the model of non-cooperative exchange introduced by Amir
at al. (1990). Some further research should also be devoted to the possibility of
generalising the results achieved in this paper to an exchange economy with more
than two commodities.
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